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Imagine a man fathering a child or 100 children a century after his
death. Sound preposterous? Think again.1
INTRODUCTION
A. The Challenge of Technology
Perhaps the most important area of legal inquiry today is the inter-
action between law and technology, for it is at this point that law
either becomes a tool for shaping the future or an obsolete inconven-
ience circumvented by increasing technological innovation. The need
to address the many aspects of that interaction is made all the more
urgent when one considers the nature of that technological develop-
ment as an autocatalytic process in which the rate of advance in-
creases because the process stimulates itself.2 The speed of that
technological change impels increasingly rapid social change and
thereby pressures social institutions to change just as rapidly. By na-
ture and design, though, law is the social institution most resistant to
rapid change; yet, the pressure of technologically driven social change
can be seen in many areas of law. One area in which the impact of
technological change on the law demonstrates the potential of both
adaptation and obsolescence is in the effect of advances in reproduc-
1. Michael D. Lemonick, The Sperm that Never Dies, TIME, June 10, 1996, at 69 (discussing the
successes of scientific teams at the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center in freezing and thawing spermatological stem cells).
2. JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL 258-59 (1997).
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tive technology on the law of inheritance. The 50,000 year-long era3
in which one could safely assume that a person's heirs could be num-
bered ended in 1953 when the technology for freezing sperm first per-
mitted the possibility of the conception of biological offspring long
after the death of the biological father.4 Current reproductive tech-
nology however has moved far beyond the ability to freeze gametes;
today the fertilized egg, a zygote, can be frozen, stored, thawed, im-
planted and brought to term years, perhaps decades, after both biolog-
ical parents have died. 5 Beyond this, a single zygote can be divided
numerous times, creating a theoretically unlimited number of identical
offspring. Indeed, scientists at the University of Pennsylvania and the
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center recently discovered
a method for freezing spermatological stem cells, thereby raising the
possibility of thawing, duplicating and implanting sperm cells for a
century or more.6 Where once the law of inheritance could rationally
account for posthumously born children by allowing a presumption of
paternity of children born to the decedent's wife within approximately
10 months of the decedent's death,7 that acknowledgment of an occa-
sionally occurring biological possibility has been rendered almost
quaint and disturbingly arbitrary in an age in which children may be
born decades after both genetic parents have died. The development
of modern reproductive technology and its widespread availability
present an important challenge to the law of inheritance: change with
technology or pass into obsolescence.
Though law has traditionally and typically been a reactive social in-
stitution, the rapid social changes brought about by new technology
are pressing the social institution of law to be more proactive. 8 The
application of that technology makes clear that a useful method for
3. The length of the era suggested here is based on the origins of modern humans and modern
human society as evidenced in Cro-Magnon settlements in Europe. It is generally accepted that
Cro-Magnon humans understood the connection between sex and reproduction as well as the
finality of death. Therefore, an understanding that an individual's offspring could, at some point,
be definitively ascertained had to have arisen at least as late as the origins of Cro-Magnon
humans, approximately 30,000 to 40,000 years ago. See THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF THE
WORLD 36-45 (John A. Garraty & Peter Gay eds., 1972).
4. Jeffrey Kluger, Eggs on the Rocks, TIME, Oct. 27, 1997, at 105 (discussing advances in cry-
opreservation technology that, in addition to freezing zygotes, now allow eggs to be frozen for
later union with sperm).
5. See generally id. (discussing scientists' ability to freeze eggs for future implantation into a
woman's uterus).
6. Lemonick, supra note 1, at 69.
7. See infra notes 210-218 and accompanying text.
8. Harvesting sperm from dead men is merely the latest twist on a century-old practice with
which law and regulation have yet to grapple fully. It is often said that law and ethics, like some
kind of wayward children, lag behind stunning advances in biomedical technology. Jeff Stryker,
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considering the questions of the inheritance status of children born
from frozen gametes and zygotes is already overdue.
B. Threshold Issues
Though lacking widespread application, the use of technology to ex-
tend reproductive capabilities is not a recent phenomenon. Arab
tribesmen purportedly used artificial insemination as early as the four-
teenth century, clandestinely diluting the gene pool of their enemies'
horses. 9 The earliest reported successful a° use of the technology on
humans occurred in 1884 in the United States when a female medical
student was artificially inseminated with sperm from the best-looking
male in the class.1 Modern, widespread application of technological
advances in human reproduction, though, probably began during the
early days of the United States space program. In 1962, Mercury as-
tronauts had their sperm frozen for future use in case exposure to
cosmic radiation while in orbit rendered them sterile.12 As this Arti-
cle explains, reproductive technology has progressed considerably
since the days of the Mercury space program.
While the legal rights of children have developed over millennia,
advances in reproductive technology now require examination of the
issues surrounding every stage of reproduction prior to birth. The ge-
netic material that eventually develops into a child can be divided into
Conceiving Justice: From Which Dead Men and for Which Survivors Should Sperm Be Har-
vested?, RECORDER, March 31, 1995 at 6.
In one sense, the capacity of the technology has simply outstripped society's ability and will-
ingness to examine the ethical and legal ramifications of all this. Scott Armstrong, Baby-Making
in the Lab: Ethics and Law Need to Catch Up with Science, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, June 26,
1984, at 21-22 (quoting Arthur Caplan, an associate at the Hastings Center, a New York institute
dealing with ethical problems in healthcare).
9. RUSSELL SCOTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY 198 (1981). The alleged practice involved
secretly depositing into the vaginas of enemy mares cloths soaked with semen from inferior
stallions. Id. As intriguing as this example may seem, the logistics of such an operation raise
serious doubts as to its frequency if not its likelihood. Nonetheless, similar accounts are found
elsewhere. See, e.g., Carolyn Sappideen, Life After Death Sperm Banks, Wills and Perpetuities,
53 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 311, 311 (1979) (referring to 15th century Arab tribes).
10. Scorr, supra, note 9, at 198. Reportedly John Hunter, a Scottish surgeon, unsuccessfully
attempted to artificially inseminate women in the late 18th century. Id.
11. Peggy Orenstein, Looking for a Donor to Call Dad, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1995, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 28, 31. Purportedly the artificial insemination involved a couple in Philadelphia in 1884.
Id. After the couple consulted a physician about their infertility, the woman was anesthetized
and unknowingly inseminated with above-described donor's sperm. Id. Other accounts report
that the eyewitness to this procedure was later disputed, thereby raising the possibility that the
story is a fabrication. See Daniel Wikler & Norma J. Wikler, Turkey-Baster Babies: The Demedi-
calization of Artificial Insemination, 69 MILBANK Q. 5, 5 (1991).
12. Andrea Mitchell Siegel, Legal Resolution to the Frozen Embryo Dilemma, 4 J. PHARMACY
& LAW 43, 46 (1994).
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five types based on the characteristics of development: gametes (eggs
and sperm), zygotes (single-cell, fertilized eggs), preembryos (four-to-
eight cell zygotes), embryos (the stage at which cell differentiation de-
velops) and fetuses. 13 Immediately, a significant threshold along this
continuum can be discerned. Gametes by themselves are not capable
of developing into human beings; zygotes, preembryos, embryos and
fetuses are. Whether this biological distinction should lead to a legal
distinction is discussed below. 14 Unless otherwise specifically noted,
however, this Article does not distinguish between zygotes, preem-
bryos or embryos-while all of these phases have the inherent biologi-
cal potential to develop into a child, none have yet been judicially
recognized as legally equivalent to a fetus, the phase which has al-
ready been the subject of considerable legal analysis. Also, rather
than covering the well-traveled territory of legal issues involving fe-
tuses, this Article addresses only those legal issues involving gametes,
zygotes, preembryos and embryos which remain legally as well as bio-
logically distinct from fetuses. 15
C. The Approach of This Analysis
This Article attempts to provide an analytical framework for resolv-
ing the issues resulting from the interaction between advances in re-
productive technology and the law of inheritance. In providing that
framework this Article critically examines several judicial efforts to
address the issues while presenting the foundation for effective analy-
sis of the numerous issues raised by this particular confluence of law
and technology. Further, in an effort to be immediately useful, the
analysis focuses on existing jurisprudence and legal theory rather than
proposing legislation, the eventual applicability of which would de-
pend on the vagaries of the political processes of future state legisla-
tures. By grounding the analysis in established legal principles rather
than potential legislation, it is hoped that this analytical framework
will be directly useful to courts called on to examine these issues.
13. Id.; Cynthia Reilly, Constitutional Limits on New Mexico's In Vitro Fertilization Law, 24
N.M. L. REV. 125, 125 (1994). This list includes only the stages which technology currently
affects. Consideration of how the law will treat future technological developments that would
enable such things as cloning (i.e., developing humans from a single cell), while deserving of
consideration in its own right, is outside the scope of this article.
14. See infra notes 317-319 and accompanying text.
15. A technical description of the process of cryopreservation is contained in the Appendix to
this Article. While the technical process itself raises no legal issues, the Appendix is provided for
the sake of demonstrating the juxtaposition of cutting-edge medical techniques and an area of
law that has remained free of radical change since feudal times.
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The analysis that follows is divided into two main sections. The first
of these examines the threshold question of whether gametes, zygotes,
preembryos and embryos may be bequeathed. Answering that ques-
tion requires an examination of existing jurisprudence, the fundamen-
tal nature of these items and federal constitutional issues. The second
major section examines the effects of allowing these items to be be-
queathed and describes how the attendant issues of filiation, preter-
mission, testate and intestate succession, and the Rule Against
Perpetuities should be analyzed. The Article concludes with a brief
consideration of the difficulties inherent in attempting legislative
solutions.
I. MAY GAMETES, ZYGOTES, PREEMBRYOS AND EMBRYOS BE
BEQUEATHED?
A. The Flawed Analysis in Hecht
Before one can address the issue of inheritance rights of children
born as a result of reproductive technology, one must first determine
the immediate legal ramifications of bequeathing gametes, zygotes,
preembryos and embryos. Indeed, the first question is whether these
items may be bequeathed at all. Hecht v. Superior Court of Los Ange-
les County,16 is the first and, so far, only case which has addressed the
question of whether gametes may be bequeathed and inherited.1 7 The
essential facts of the case can be stated concisely. William E. Kane's
will stated: "I bequeath all right, title, and interest that I may have in
any specimens of my sperm stored with any sperm bank or similar
facility for storage to Deborah Ellen Hecht." 18 Subsequent provisions
in Kane's will made it clear that he hoped Hecht would use the sperm
to impregnate herself.' 9 Kane's two adult children each filed separate
16. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993).
17. Id. at 283-84. Because the Hecht case involved a bequest of sperm, it is logical that its
reasoning would also apply to eggs, there being no logical or scientific reason to distinguish
between the two types of gametes. However, in 1995, Scottish scientists announced that they
had found the first known human to develop from an unfertilized egg. First Human from Unfer-
tilized Egg is Found, USA TODAY, Sept. 29, 1995, at Dl. Normally, a fertilized egg, containing
genes from mom and dad, splits into two, then four, then eight and so on. The egg in question
was fertilized eventually by a tardy sperm, but apparently it began the process of splitting and
multiplying before dad showed up. Id. "[T]he delay [in fertilization] was enough to keep the
father's genes from reaching all the baby's cells." Id. Nonetheless, the rarity of this occurrence
militates against a legal distinction between the two types of gametes.
The Hecht opinion does not address inheritance of zygotes or embryos. Given the significant
biological differences between gametes and fertilized eggs, the Hecht rationale is not necessarily
applicable to bequests of either zygotes or embryos.
18. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 276.
19. Id. at 277.
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will contests.20 Shortly thereafter the parties concluded a settlement
agreement 2l which later gave rise to a second disputed settlement
agreement.2 2 Litigation over the second settlement agreement raised
the issue of whether Kane's sperm was legally subject to the probate
court's jurisdiction (i.e., whether it was actually part of his estate and
therefore covered by the settlement agreements which referred to the
division of that estate).2 3
After considering arguments from each side, the trial court ordered
the sperm destroyed as requested by Kane's children.2 4 The Califor-
nia Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering destruction of the sperm.2 5 Before it could
make such a ruling though, the court first had to decide whether the
probate court had jurisdiction over the sperm, given the probate
court's limited jurisdiction.2 6 In concluding that the sperm was subject
to the jurisdiction of the trial court, the court of appeals held that the
sperm was part of Kane's probate estate. 27 An analysis of the court of
appeals' reasoning leading to that conclusion reveals how difficult
resolving the legal problems created by new technology can be. The
court of appeals first noted that probate court jurisdiction is limited to
property of the decedent. 28 Thus, for the trial court to have authority
over Kane's sperm, the sperm had to be the property of Kane's es-
tate.2 9 After stating that probate jurisdiction is based on "property, '30
the court found itself confronting one of the most vexing questions in
20. Id.
21. Id. The agreement stated, inter alia, after payment of all specific bequests, debts and obli-
gations that sums in excess of $190,000 net available for distribution be distributed 20% to Hecht
and 40% each to Kane's two children. Id.
22. Id. at 278.
23. Id. at 278-83.
24. Id. at 279. The trial court made this ruling without offering any rationale and apparently
did so merely to put the question squarely before the court of appeals. When Hecht's counsel
asked for the legal basis of the ruling the trial court stated, "It really does not matter, does it? If
I am right, I am right and if I am wrong, I am wrong. As you know, I am persuaded by the
arguments in the moving papers. This is something that is going to have to be decided by the
appellate courts. Let's get a decision." Id. Before ruling, the court also stated, "Obviously we
are all agreed that we are forging new frontiers because science has run ahead of common law.
And we have got to have some sort of appellate decision telling us what rights are in these
uncharted territories." Id. at 279 n.3.
25. Id. at 291.
26. Id. at 280-81.
27. Id. at 281. The court of appeals explicitly stated that it was not ruling on the validity of
Kane's will or the settlement agreements. Id. at 284.
28. Id. at 280.
29. Id. The court noted that the argument of Kane's children that Kane had no ownership or
possessory interest in his sperm once it left his body was self-defeating "because the sperm
would not constitute part of Kane's estate and the probate court would not have jurisdiction
over its disposition." Id. at 280-81.
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all of law-what is property? The court of appeals avoided answering
this question itself by relying on section 62 of the California Probate
Code which provides a redundant and circular definition that property
is: "[A]nything that may be the subject of ownership and includes
both real and personal property and any interest therein."' 31 Unfortu-
nately, though the court acknowledged this to be a "broad definition
of property, '32 that definition fails to help the larger analysis since it
provides no guidance as to whether gametic material can be personal
property. In fact, as discussed below, this definition actually led the
court into a flawed analysis.
Undeterred by the circular definition of property in the California
Probate Code, the Hecht court then began an analysis into the nature
of rights in semen.33 First, the court reasoned that the California
Supreme Court holding in Moore v. Regents of University of Califor-
nia34 did not mandate a holding that Kane had no property interest in
his sperm.35 In fact, the court noted that Moore actually supported a
holding that "the Legislature did not intend Health and Safety Code
section 7054.4 to resolve the issue of the 'property' rights retained by
the donor of sperm, let alone the issue of insemination with the sperm
of a deceased donor. '36 The court then provided a lengthy recitation
of the discussion in Davis v. Davis37 (a Tennessee divorce case which
involved a dispute over possession of frozen preembryos), 38 before
abruptly concluding that Kane had "an interest, in the nature of own-
ership, . . [in his sperm] sufficient to constitute 'property' within the
meaning of Probate Code section 62."' 39
While it is true that accepting this argument would result in a reversal of the trial court's ruling
on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it is not at all true that it would ultimately be
self-defeating for Kane's children's position. However, accepting their argument would present
the court with a very difficult question: if Kane did not retain an ownership or possessory inter-
est in the sperm once it left his body, then who, if anyone, has that interest?
Resolution of that question though is not necessary if one concludes, as the court ultimately
did in Hecht, that Kane did retain an ownership or possessory interest in his sperm when he
deposited it with California Cryobank. Id. at 283.
30. Id. at 281.
31. Id. Thus, the definition relied on by the probate code and the court of appeal can be
stated more concisely: "property is property."
32. Id.
33. Id. at 281-84.
34. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
35. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 281 (citing Moore v. Regents of University of California, 793
P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990)).
36. Id.
37. 842 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Stowe v. Davis, 507 U.S. 911
(1993).
38. Id. at 588-97; see infra text accompanying notes 112-137.
39. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283.
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Unfortunately, the reasoning of the Hecht court is seriously flawed.
First, the Davis case is not relevant to the issue of whether sperm
should be considered property. Davis involved litigation over which
spouse should be awarded custody of several frozen preembryos.40
Mrs. Davis wanted them for future implantation; 41 Mr. Davis wanted
them in order to prevent future unwanted fatherhood.42 In fact, the
Davis court refused to classify the preembryos as property.43 Thus, the
Hecht court's summary of the Davis case was nothing more than an
interesting but irrelevant aside that served only to obscure the fact
that the Hecht court did not provide any reason why Kane's sperm
should be considered property of his estate. The court noted that "at
the time of his death, decedent had an interest, in the nature of owner-
ship, to the extent that he had decision making authority as to the
sperm within the scope of policy set by law."'44 The court did not ex-
plain what it meant by the phrase "within the scope of policy set by
law" but simply cited the Davis case as authority for the statement. 45
The Hecht court then concluded that Kane's interest was "in the na-
ture of ownership . . . [which was] sufficient to constitute
'property.' "46
Despite basing its entire rationale on Kane's decision making au-
thority regarding the sperm, the Hecht court did not discuss the source
of that authority. Perhaps worse, the court's reasoning that Kane's
authority was "in the nature of ownership," and that this was sufficient
to constitute "property" under the Probate Code was a non-sequitur.
The California Probate Code states that property is "anything that
may be the subject of ownership" 47; it does not state that property is
anything that can be subject to an interest in the nature of ownership.
Thus, the Hecht court based its rationale on decision making authority
that the decedent was not shown to possess which was then elliptically
declared to be equivalent to a circular definition of property.
In approaching the issue this way, the court avoided the difficult
task of defining "property." The California Probate Code's definition,
even if one ignores its improper use of the term to be defined in the
40. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 597.
44. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 281.
45. Id. This cryptic phrase, used by the court in Hecht, is almost identical to language used by
the Davis court. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597. Unfortunately, the Davis court did not explain this
phrase either.
46. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283.
47. CAL. PROB. CODE § 62 (West 1996).
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definition, is not helpful because it amounts to a tautology: property is
anything that can be owned. The next logical question is of course:
"what can be owned?" Answer: property.48
The difficulty in adequately defining the fundamental concept of
property is no doubt why the Hecht court relied on the inadequate
definition of "property" in the California Probate Code; however, the
Hecht court grossly erred in the way it applied that definition. By
examining whether sperm can be property (i.e., something that can be
owned), the court improperly conflated the concept of property and
the concept of ownership. This explains why, in attempting to answer
whether sperm can be property, the Hecht court relied heavily on the
Davis court's effort to answer the same question regarding preem-
bryos. As a result, the court set itself the Herculean tasks of answer-
ing two questions of near-metaphysical proportions: "What is
property?" and "Can sperm be property?" Neither question is appro-
priate and answering them in both the Davis and Hecht cases was
unnecessary. 49
The Hecht court's proper task was to decide whether the sperm was
property of (i.e., owned by) Kane's estate. By posing the issue in that
manner, one keeps in mind that "property" and "ownership" are often
equivalent terms and are applied as conclusions based on an individ-
ual's demonstration of control over the item in question. As one com-
mentator has pointed out:
[U]sing terms such as "ownership" or "property" [to describe em-
bryos] risks misunderstanding. Ownership does not signify that em-
bryos may be treated in all respects like other property. Rather, the
term merely designates who decides which legally available options
will occur, such as creation, freezing, discard, donation, use in re-
search, and placement in a uterus. Although the bundle of property
rights attached to one's ownership of an embryo may be more cir-
48. While this begins to sound like the Abbott and Costello "Who's on first?" routine, defin-
ing property without being circular or resorting to tautology has proven to be very difficult.
Property has been called "one of the broadest terms known in the law" and is usually described
in terms of various rights of control. Wells Labberton v. General Cas. Co. of America, 332 P.2d
250, 255 (Wash. 1958) (quoting Thorrez S. Maes Mfg. Co. v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 32 F. Supp.
110, 114 (E.D. Mich. 1939)); see also STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 22-27
(1990) (characterizing property as the relation between things and rights); Bonnie Steinbock,
Sperm as Property, 62 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 57, 60-62 (1995) (discussing commentators who
define property as stemming from dispositional rights to interests in reference to the interests of
others).
49. The question of "what is property?" is considered infra in the text accompanying foot-
notes 72-77.
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cumscribed than for other things, it is an ownership or property in-
terest nonetheless.50
Asking the question of whether sperm is a "thing that can be
owned" actually requires the court to determine if sperm has a legally
recognized existence. While appropriate for rights that have no physi-
cal existence, asking this question in relation to something with physi-
cal existence is absurd. 51 There is no question that sperm, having
physical existence, is susceptible of ownership and therefore can be
property; the appropriate question is "whose property is it?" Thus,
the proper starting place for the analysis regarding Kane's sperm is:
did he have a legal right of authority over it such that it was his
property?
The correct analysis should proceed as follows: (1) Does the object
in question exist? (2) If so, then is it susceptible of ownership? (i.e.,
can it be reduced to someone's control or possession?); (3) Who has
possession of the object? (whoever has possession is presumed to own
the object unless there is contrary evidence); (4) If a conflicting claim
of control exists beyond that arising from the fact of possession, then
what is the nature or degree of that claim of control? In every analy-
sis of ownership, at some point a level of control is recognized such
that the object is declared the property of an individual. Applying the
foregoing analysis to the Hecht case, the first two questions are an-
swered in the affirmative. The third question is also easily answered:
"California Cryobank, Inc. possessed the sperm." Failing to answer
the fourth question is where the Hecht court faltered. Although the
Hecht court implicitly recognized some conflicting claims of control
between Kane's estate and California Cryobank, Inc., the court did
not explore the strength of those conflicting claims.
Without a conflicting claim of control, California Cryobank's pos-
session of the sperm would give rise to a presumption of ownership
(i.e., California Cryobank alone would have the right to decide what
to do with the sperm). However, the court ruled that at the time of his
death Kane retained some decision making authority regarding his
sperm stored at Cryobank. 52 Presumably the court found this author-
ity in the contractual relationship he had with California Cryobank.53
The Specimen Storage Agreement signed by Kane stated that in the
50. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 104 (1994) (emphasis added.).
51. "The concept of 'property' in the law is extremely broad and abstract. The legal definition
of 'property' most often refers not to a particular physical object, but rather to the legal bundle
of rights recognized in that object." Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 1991).
52. Hecht v. Kane, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 281 (1993).
53. This must be presumed because the court does not explicitly state this.
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event of his death, California Cryobank was to follow the instructions
of the executor of Kane's estate regarding continued storage or re-
lease of the sperm.54 What is important to note here is that by giving
decision making authority to the executor of Kane's estate, the execu-
tor as an individual was given decision making authority over the
sperm. A subsequent provision in the agreement authorized Cry-
obank to release the sperm to Hecht and Kane's physician, but this
provision did not require Cryobank to make such a release.55 Kane's
will stated that he bequeathed "all right, title and interest that I may
have in any specimens of my sperm stored with any sperm bank or
similar facility for storage to Deborah Ellen Hecht. ' 56 These facts in-
dicate three potential claimants to ownership of the sperm: Cryobank
(by virtue of possession), the executor of Kane's estate (by virtue of
the Specimen Storage Agreement), and Kane's estate (by virtue of
Kane's decision making authority over the sperm when he died). An
examination of the strengths of those claims is necessary to determine
whether the sperm was property of Kane's estate and therefore sub-
ject to the probate court's jurisdiction.
According to the terms of the Specimen Storage Agreement, Cry-
obank ceded all control over the sperm following Kane's death to the
executor of Kane's estate.5 7 By relinquishing this control, Cryobank
relinquished any possible claim of ownership to the sperm upon
Kane's death. Therefore, only two possible claimants to ownership of
the sperm remained: the executor of Kane's estate and Kane's estate
itself. In comparing the strengths of these claims it is important to
note that the Specimen Storage Agreement did not purport to retain
any decision making control in favor of Kane himself-the Agree-
ment expressly gave that authority to the executor of Kane's estate.
Further, no facts indicating that Kane himself retained personal deci-
sion making authority over the sperm are mentioned in the court's
decision. If Kane did not have such authority at the time of his death,
then his estate had no such right. Therefore, even though Kane's will
stated that he bequeathed whatever interest in the specimens he had
to Hecht, Kane was apparently not bequeathing any interest in the
sperm because he did not have any interest to bequeath. Based on the
54. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 276. "In the event of the death of the client [William E. Kane],
the client instructs the Cryobank to... [c]ontinue to store [the specimens] upon request of the
executor of the estate [or] [r]elease the specimens to the executor of the estate." Id.
55. Id. "I, William Everett Kane .... authorize the [sperm bank] to release my semen speci-
mens (vials) to Deborah Ellen Hecht. I am also authorizing specimens to be released to recipi-
ent's physician Dr. Kathryn Moyer." Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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facts described in the court of appeals' opinion, the only party with
any claim to ownership of the sperm was the executor of Kane's es-
tate.58 This means that the probate court did not have jurisdiction
over the vials of sperm because they were neither part of nor con-
trolled by Kane's estate.59
Since the proper analysis of the situation in Hecht leads to the con-
clusion that Kane's sperm was not part of his estate, the question of
whether gametes may be bequeathed has still not been properly ad-
dressed by any court. Therefore, before the issues surrounding inheri-
tance rights of children born as a result of advances in reproductive
technology can be examined, it is necessary to determine whether the
gametes, zygotes, preembryos, and embryos may be bequeathed and
inherited.
B. What May Be Bequeathed
To answer the question of whether gametes, zygotes, preembryos
and embryos may be bequeathed we must first examine the existing
general structure of probate law regarding what may be bequeathed.
58. As the court noted, it is unclear whether Kane was referring to Hecht when he used the
term "executor" in the agreement with Cryobank even though he named Hecht as executor of
his estate. The complicating fact is that, for reasons not in the record on appeal, Hecht did not
become the executor of the estate. Id. n.1.
Ultimately, perhaps the correct resolution would have been that Hecht was entitled to posses-
sion of the sperm by virtue of her being named the executor or by virtue of the settlement
agreements signed while the estate was in probate, but that analysis is irrelevant to the issue of
whether the sperm was part of Kane's estate.
59. Thus, the probate court did not have jurisdiction to order the sperm destroyed. However,
because the court of appeals ruled that the probate court did have jurisdiction but abused its
discretion in ordering the sperm destroyed, id., the immediate practical effect is the same.
Yet, the ultimate effect may have been quite different. A ruling by the court of appeals that
the executor as an individual owned the sperm would have required an inquiry into to whom the
Specimen Agreement was referring by the term "executor." Without exploring in depth what is
now a tangential issue, it appears that Kane was referring to Hecht by this term. If this is so,
then the general references to Kane's estate used in the settlement agreements signed by Hecht
and Kane's children would not have included the vials of sperm because these would not have
been part of Kane's estate because they would have already been given to. Hecht before Kane's
death via the Specimen Agreement. In short, the proper analysis would have resulted in Hecht
receiving all 15 vials of sperm rather than the five she received when the probate court applied
the terms of the settlement agreements. Because Hecht's goal (and Kane's wish) was that she be
impregnated with Kane's sperm, the practical difference between her having 15 vials as opposed
to five could be considerable.
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1. Are Gametes, Zygotes, Preembryos and Embryos "Property"?
Since modern probate law allows property to be bequeathed, 60 the
first question to be answered is whether gametes, zygotes, preembryos
and embryos are "property." Only one court has based a decision on
the assumption that any of these items is property;61 however, as the
following analysis demonstrates, the opinion is more interesting for
what it avoided than for what it considered.
In York v. Jones,62 the plaintiffs, "the progenitors of the cry-
opreserved human pre-zygote," 63 sought the release of their frozen
zygote from the facility where the zygote was stored, the Howard and
Georgeanna Jones Institute for Reproductive Medicine (the "Jones
Institute"). 64 The Yorks wanted the zygote transferred to a similar
facility in California.65 The Jones Institute refused, citing the contract
signed by the Yorks.66 Although the York court never specifically
held that the zygote was property, that the court assumed this to be
the case is clear from the related legal conclusions in the opinion.
First, the court held that the contract between the Yorks and the Jones
Institute was a contract of bailment with regard to the zygote. 67 In
reaching this conclusion, the court stated, "The obligation to return
the property is implied from the fact of lawful possession of the per-
sonal property of another. ' 68 The court rested its conclusion of a con-
tract of bailment in part on the Jones Institute's consistent reference
to the zygote as "property. '69 The court rejected the Jones Institute's
60. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987). While the authority of the state and federal govern-
ments to control the laws of testamentary disposition and inheritance is clear, the United States
Supreme Court in Hodel v. Irving observed that, "[i]n one form or another, the right to pass on
property.., has been part of the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times.... Even the
United States [defendant herein] concedes that total abrogation of the right to pass property is
unprecedented and likely unconstitutional." Id. at 716.
61. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
62. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
63. Id. at 422. The court's opinion uses the term "pre-zygote" apparently because the Yorks
signed a document entitled "Informed Consent: Human Pre-Zygotes Cryopreservation." Id. at
424. Later in the opinion the court refers to the item as an embryo. Id. In fact neither term is
correct. As explained earlier, a fertilized egg (as in the York case) is a zygote. An embryo is the
term applied to the collection of cells which have begun to demonstrate cell differentiation. The
term "pre-zygote" may have been intended to distinguish between implanted zygotes and pre-
implanted zygotes, but in any event still refers to a fertilized egg and therefore a zygote.
For the sake of consistent use of correct medical terminology, the term "zygote" will be used
in the following discussion of the York case.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 425.
67. Id.
68. Id. (emphasis added.)
69. Id.
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argument that the Yorks' property interest in the zygote was limited
by Virginia's Human Research statute,70 but the court did not reject
the Jones Institute's characterization of the zygote as property. In-
deed, the court later recognized the Yorks' claim of detinue, holding
that the requisite elements of detinue had been established under Vir-
ginia law: "(1) plaintiff must have a property interest in the thing
sought to be recovered; .. .(3) the property is capable of identifica-
tion; (4) the property must be of some value. '71 The court then added
"if the property is in the possession of a bailee, an action in detinue
accrues upon demand and refusal to return the property. 72
Although the assumption that the York zygote was property is in-
teresting, perhaps the most interesting aspect of the York case is what
the court did not address. First, as noted above, the court did not
directly address the issue of whether the zygote was properly classified
as property, opting instead to accept that this was the correct ap-
proach without examination of it. Second, the court did not question
the validity of the contract between the Yorks and the Jones Institute,
but simply applied the terms of the contract as written rather than
examine whether the contract was enforceable in the first place. Yet
consideration of both of these issues is critical to the proper analysis,
for if the zygotes are not property, then obviously they cannot be the
subject of a contract. Thus, as was true in the Hecht case, the proper
analysis must begin with a determination of what is property.
While defining "property" has often proven to be a difficult task for
judges and commentators alike, the most accurate considerations of
the question have recognized that the term "property" does not refer
to things, but the relationship between those things and people.73 For
example, the definition of property found in Black's Law Dictionary,
"The word [property] is ...commonly used to denote everything
which is the subject of ownership," 74 is of little utility because it does
not describe the relationship implicit in the term "ownership." The
term "ownership" refers to the degree of control one has over some-
thing. When an individual demonstrates a sufficient degree of control
over something, the law deems the individual to "own" that thing; it is
deemed to be the individual's "property." Thus, consideration of
"what is property?" starts with a simple answer: everything with physi-
70. Id. at 426.
71. Id. at 427 (emphasis added).
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. See supra note 51.
74. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1216 (6th ed. 1990) (citing discussion in Wells Labberton v.
General Casualty Co. of America, 332 P.2d 250, 252, 254 (Wash. 1958)).
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cal existence is property.75 At this point, there is no legal aspect to the
inquiry since the fact of existence is at issue. The next question
though is purely legal: "what is susceptible of ownership?" Here soci-
ety has placed restrictions. For example, while the sun has physical
existence, and therefore is property, no one may own it. The reason is
simple: the law does not recognize ownership in any item that cannot
be placed under anyone's physical control or custody. Thus, the sun is
property which is not susceptible of ownership.
The category of things which are susceptible of ownership is itself
divided into two categories. The first category is comprised of those
things which are susceptible of ownership (i.e., can be placed under
one's control) but which the law says may not be owned, as is the case
with the prohibition against ownership of human beings.76 The com-
plementary category is comprised of things susceptible of ownership
which may be owned. This category contains all things not specifically
removed from it by law (see Chart 1).77 Thus human genetic material
initially appears to be property that may be owned because no law
prohibits its ownership. 78 Nonetheless, the questions presented by the
analysis at hand (whether gametes, zygotes, preembryos and embryos
may be owned, and if owned, may they be bequeathed) must be con-
sidered in greater depth.
There is no question that gametes, zygotes, preembryos and em-
bryos are "property" because they have physical existence. Similarly,
there is no question that they are susceptible of ownership because
someone always exercises control over them either by possession or
by the authority to decide what is to be done with them. Indeed, no
75. Many commentators have spent considerable time describing what constitutes ownership
as though ownership is equivalent to the concept of property. See, e.g., Bonnie Steinbock, Sperm
as Property, 62 STAN. L & POL'Y REV., 57, 60-62 (1995)). However, while it is not possible to
have ownership without property, it is possible for property to exist without ownership. Id.
76. It is probably more accurate to say that a living human being cannot be sold. Presumably,
everyone "owns" his or her own body (the extent of control one has over it is indistinguishable
from that control one has over other objects), but one is not permitted to transfer that ownership
while alive. The fact of being alive is critical, because transfer of body ownership after death
results whenever the deceased has left instructions donating his or her body for research or
educational purposes.
77. See infra Tables 1(A), 1(B). For the sake of completeness, this category can be further
sub-divided into categories of property which may be owned but which are regulated by limiting
the amount of control the owner may exercise over the property. However, aside from very
general jurisprudential rules such as those prohibiting creation of a nuisance, restricting an
owner's degree of control is a legislative act.
78. Whether human genetic material (regardless of its developmental stage) should be re-
moved from the "may be owned" category is a philosophical and theological issue. Neither
medically nor legally are gametes, zygotes, preembryos, or embryos equivalent to "people."
Whether society should define them as "people" or place them in the "may not own" category is
beside the point-they are currently not in that category.
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CHART 1
ILLUSTRATION OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR
ANALYZING THE NATURE OF HUMAN
GENETIC MATERIAL
Property
I
Anything with
physical existence
Things which can
Things which be owned: i.e., can be
cannot be owned; reduced to physical
i.e.,cannot be control or custody
reduced to physical (e.g., land, animals,
control or custody people)
(e.g., the sun)
Things which can be Th
owned but by law may r
not be owned (e.g., people, sl
nuclear weapons, certain by
animal species or parts at
thereof) to
I
Rights: things without physical
existence but deemed by law
to be property (e.g., ownership
in a corporation as represented
by corporate stock) (Note: There
is no further division here because
the legislative act of creating things
that fall into this category fuses
both control and ownership.)
ings which can be owned and
ty be owned; i.e., everything not
xcifically excluded from ownership
statute; hence, human genetic material
any stage of development prior
personhood is included here.
Things which can be owned
and may be owned, control
over which has been
restricted by legislation
Things which can be owned and
may be owned, control over which
has not been restricted by legis-
lation (gametes, zygotes, pre-
and embryos also fit within this
subcategory)
one has questioned whether the donation of sperm or eggs to various
facilities by a living donor is a transfer of ownership of property, and
currently, there is no legal prohibition to ownership of these items.
In fact, when the issue of ownership has been raised, courts have
consistently recognized property rights involving individual parts of
one's body. For example, in United States v. Garber,79 the Internal
Revenue Service sought a ruling that the defendant owed taxes on
income received from the sale of her blood.80 The Fifth Circuit re-
jected the defendant's argument that sale of her blood plasma was
merely a conversion of a capital asset into cash and therefore gener-
ated no income: "[B]lood plasma, like a chicken's eggs, a sheep's
wool, or like any salable part of the human body, is tangible property
79. 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979).
80. Id. at 93-94.
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which in this case commanded a selling price dependent on its
value."' 81 The most widely discussed case regarding property interest
in body tissue is Moore v. Regents of University of California,82 in
which the California Supreme Court held that the plaintiff did not retain
a property interest in tissue removed from his body. 83 However, the
crucial fact in the California Supreme Court's analysis was that
Moore's expectation of continued ownership interest in his cells was
specifically restricted by statute.84 Obviously, the court's discussion of
whether Moore retained an ownership interest in the removed tissue
implied that Moore did have a property interest in that tissue before it
was removed. The implication of such cases is that all human biologi-
cal products, including genetic material, must first be assumed to be
susceptible of ownership.
The correctness of this assumption is evidenced by the fact that the
practice of harvesting reproductive material from the deceased is evi-
dently occurring without legal restraint. For instance, in December
1994 in New York, twenty-nine-year old Anthony Baez died.85 At the
request of Baez' wife, within twenty-four hours of Baez' death, Dr.
Peter Schlegel, an infertility specialist, harvested sperm from the dead
body and placed them in liquid nitrogen storage. 86 One week after
the Baez procedure, a widow in Chicago asked doctors to remove and
preserve some of her late husband's sperm, which they did.87 Cur-
rently, no statutory or common law impediment to harvesting of
sperm exists, and there is little doubt that such acts will increase in
frequency. 88
81. Id. at 97. Unfortunately, the court did not elaborate on its reasoning. Moreover, this
statement is dictum because the court of appeals reversed Garber's conviction on other grounds:
[B]ecause the district court refused to permit Bierman, the expert for the government,
and Nail, the expert for the defense, to testify and because it reserved to itself the job of
unriddling the tax law, thus completely obscuring from the jury the most important
theory of Garber's defense-that she could not have willfully evaded a tax if there
existed a reasonable doubt in the law that a tax was due-her trial was rendered funda-
mentally unfair.
Id.
82. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
83. Id. at 488.
84. Id. at 489.
85. Maggie Gallagher, About Sperm: The Ultimate Deadbeat Dads, NEWSDAY, Feb. 1, 1995, at
A28, available in LEXIS, News Library, Newsdy File.
86. ld.; see also Stryker, supra note 8, at 6 (discussing legal and ethical issues associated with
the removal of sperm from deceased men).
87. Stryker, supra note 8, at 6. For a detailed account of a similar case in Florida, see Laura
Muha, She Lost Her Husband but Saved Their Dream, REDBOOK, May 1995, at 79.
88. See Myung Oak Kim, More Women Seek Insemination with Sperm of Dead, Study Finds,
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, May 30, 1997, at A25, available in 1997 WL 4177308. A study by the
University of Pennsylvania conducted in 1995 discovered that of 273 fertility clinics surveyed, 82
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However, while it is proper to conclude that these items are prop-
erty susceptible of ownership, this does not mean that they may be
bequeathed. While the state may not totally abrogate the ability of an
individual to pass property,89 the state may restrict how and what may
be bequeathed. 90 Therefore, the next issue is whether gametes, zy-
gotes, preembryos or embryos are or should be restricted or excluded
either individually or entirely from the category of things that may be
bequeathed. An examination of the law of property and the law of
wills reveals that such a restriction would be both unprecedented and
contrary to the trend of legal development in these areas.
2. Restrictions on Bequeathing One's Biological Material
Consideration of whether there currently exists any theoretical ba-
sis for prohibiting the bequeathing of one's own biological material
requires examination of possible restrictions regarding bequeathing
parts or products of one's body. Other than the English common law
rule that no one could own a dead body,9' there does not appear to be
any restriction on the bequeathing of any physical thing. Indeed, sev-
reported "requests for postmortem extraction without the man's prior consent between 1980 and
1995. More than half the requests were between June 1994 and July 1995." Id.; see also Sue
Reid, Over a Husband's Dead Body, LONDON TIMES, Oct. 20, 1996, available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, Ltimes File (describing several instances of requests and attempts at harvesting and
artificial insemination in the United States and Great Britain); cf. Edith M. Lederer, British
Court Denies Woman Use of Late Spouse's Sperm, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Oct. 18, 1996, at A6,
available in 1996 WL 11395327 (noting that Diane Blood was denied use of her late husband's
sperm by the High Court because she did not have his written permission as required by the
statutorily authorized Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority).
89. See United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625, 627-28 (1895) (holding that the state has the
power to impose limitations upon property passed by will-i.e., inheritance tax-but the right to
dispose of property by will stands); see also Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715-18 (1987) (discuss-
ing escheat statutes as a permissible interference with the laws of devise and descent, but finding
that the statute in question "went too far").
90. Perkins, 163 U.S. at 628.
91. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 20 Ch. D. 659, 665 (Ch. 1882) (holding that executors have
no property interest in a dead body). Such holdings were consistent with the 18th and 19th
century practice in Britain of allowing people to dig up corpses (often within hours of interment)
and to sell them to local medical schools for educational dissection. ScoTr, supra note 9, at 5.
Such actions were not illegal and did not violate any property rights of any party. Id. at 6-7.
However, the public eventually became sufficiently outraged at the excesses to which this prac-
tice gave rise when three men were arrested for befriending lonely or delict people, luring them
to their rooms for whiskey, then killing them and selling their bodies to local medical schools.
Id. at 8-10. Of the three only William Burke was convicted of the murders. Id. at 9. He was
sentenced to be hanged by the neck until dead and then, fittingly, publicly dissected. Id. at 10.
Mr. Burke's lasting legacy is to have introduced into the English language the verb "burke": "1.
To kill by suffocation or strangulation so as to leave the body intact and suitable for dissection. 2.
To suppress quietly." Id. A detailed discussion of this and other episodes involving "resurrec-
tionists," as they were called, can be found in THE BODY AS PROPERTY. ScoTr, supra note 9, at
5-10.
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eral courts have recognized various interests associated with the de-
ceased's body that amount to either property rights or their
equivalent.92 The result is that so many inroads have been made into
the common law rule against ownership of a dead body that it is more
accurate to say that one does inherit a property interest in the de-
ceased's body, subject to certain restrictions. 93 The Utah Supreme
Court in Smart v. Moyer,94 in deciding whether a body could be ex-
humed ten months following burial in order to be cremated as in-
structed in the deceased's will, concisely summarized the state of the
law:
It is our view that the laws relating to wills and the descent of prop-
erty were not intended to relate to the body of a deceased; and that
it forms no part of the "property" of one's estate in the usual
sense.... Nevertheless, we agree with petitioner's contention that a
person has some interest in his body, and the organs thereof, of such
a nature that he should be able to make a disposition thereof, which
should be recognized and held to be binding after his death, so long
as that is done within the limits of reason and decency as related to
the accepted customs of mankind.95
The court also observed, "It appears that the modern view adopted by
a majority of courts that have considered the matter recognize that
The common law rule that a body cannot be owned resulted from ecclesiastical jurisdiction
over dead bodies:
[F]rom and after the time of the Norman Conquest and until the nineteenth century,
the right of possession and disposition of a dead body was solely the subject of ecclesi-
astical cognizance .... The church took the body to itself. It held that a corpse was
appropriated by it, by divine service and consecrated burial. The spirit departed to the
realms of the supernatural; the body was held by the divine agent to await resurrection
.... [The common law courts were primarily concerned with material considerations
surrounding property rights, but] were powerless respecting the body itself, which was
solely the subject of ecclesiastic control.
PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS AND OF BURIAL AND BURIAL PLACES 125-27
(2d ed. 1950).
92. See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that a decision
as to whether a widow had a "property interest" in her husband's corneas was unnecessary,
because "the aggregate of rights granted by the state of Ohio to Deborah Brotherton rises to the
level of a 'legitimate claim of entitlement' in Steven Brotherton's body .. . protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
93. For example, the deceased's relatives can decide how the body will be disposed of and
whether to have an autopsy. E.g., Everman v. Davis, 561 N.E.2d 547, 550 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989)
(holding family members have a right to the body for purposes of preparation, mourning, and
burial; however, they may not have the right to refuse an autopsy if the person died in an unu-
sual manner). Further, the deceased's relatives have the right to sue for wrongful autopsies and
mishandling of the body. E.g., Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass'n, 514 N.E.2d 430, 436 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1986) (holding that descendants of decedent have a cause of action when remains are
disturbed).
94. 577 P.2d 108 (Utah 1978).
95. Id. at 110 (citations omitted).
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there is a property right of some nature [in one's dead body], some-
times referred to as a quasi-property right."'96 In fact, while courts
have refused to recognize a traditional property interest in the de-
ceased's body, 97 several courts have recognized that relatives of the
deceased also have some kind of property interest in the deceased's
body.98 As the court in Brotherton v. Cleveland99 correctly pointed
out, the common law has been steadily moving toward a recognition
of the next of kin's quasi-property rights in the deceased's body. 100
Absent issues of public interest, 10 1 there would appear to be no reason
against following the deceased's wishes regarding the deceased's
remains.
Ultimately, deciding issues of control does not properly turn on
whether the deceased's body or its products are labeled "property" or
whether one's rights are labeled "property rights"; what matters is that
courts examine the substance of a party's right.'02 As the above dis-
cussion demonstrates, modern jurisprudence recognizes the rights of
the deceased and the deceased's relatives which include the right of
control. That jurisprudence also indicates that the deceased's wishes
concerning the posthumous disposition of gametes, zygotes, preem-
bryos or embryos should be respected and carried out. Interestingly,
research has failed to uncover any court decision or statute which has
prevented cryogenic preservation of either the deceased's body or
brain. Since presumably those individuals who have had their bodies
or brains placed in cryogenic storage left such instructions in their
wills (cryogenic storage cannot occur until after death), it appears that
storage of the body and its parts by cryogenic methods is no more
96. Id. n.5.
97. See, for example, State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986), in which the Florida
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality under Florida's Constitution of a law which al-
lowed the removal of corneal tissue from decedent without notice to or consent from the dece-
dent's next of kin. Id. at 1189. "The view that the next of kin has no property right but merely a
limited right to possess the body for burial purposes is universally accepted by courts and com-
mentators." Id. at 1192.
98. See, e.g., Arnaud v. Odom, 870 F.2d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1989) (concluding that Louisiana
statutes have established a quasi-property right of survivors in the remains of their deceased
relatives); Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984) ("Under Arkansas law, the next of
kin does have a quasi-property right in a dead body.").
99. 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991).
100. Id. at 481.
101. For example, a California Court of Appeals upheld a district court's refusal to issue an
injunction that would have prevented an autopsy so that the plaintiff's body could be cryonically
preserved. Donaldson v. Van de Kamp, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 61 (Ct. App. 1992). The plaintiff also
unsuccessfully sought an order preventing criminal prosecution of the cryonics laboratory or
staff who participated in the "premortem cryogenic suspension" of the plaintiff's body (i.e., as-
sisted suicide in preparation for cryogenic preservation). Id.
102. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 481-82.
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objectionable than disposal by burial or cremation, and that condi-
tional bequests to that effect will be upheld if reasonable.103 Thus it
appears that the deceased's estate has a recognized right regarding
disposition of the deceased's body that equates to a property interest.
What is discernable from the preceding discussion is that the list of
what may be bequeathed, at least with regard to things with physical
existence, has rarely been restricted and has actually been expanded
over the centuries. There does not appear to be any precedent for
denying the right of someone to bequeath sperm, zygotes, preembryos
and embryos. In essence, one's body, its tissue and its parts have re-
peatedly been treated as analogous to, if not actually, property. As
the following section establishes, not even the argument that these
items are analogous to human beings is sufficient to support a prohibi-
tion of the right to pass them at death.
3. The Fallacy of Analogizing Genetic Material to Human Beings
Perhaps the most controversial argument in favor of prohibiting the
right to bequeath gametes, zygotes, preembryos and embryos is that
they are not analogous to human tissue or body parts but are more
properly considered analogous to human beings.'0 4 Thus, goes the
reasoning, if human beings may not be bequeathed, then gametes, zy-
gotes, preembryos and embryos may not be bequeathed. However,
several legal and scientific arguments against this conclusion exist.
First, as one commentator has pointed out, the proper scientific classi-
fication is against an analogy to persons:
In... [the Anglo- American legal] tradition, legal personhood does
not exist until live birth and separation from the mother. Common
law prohibitions on abortion protected fetuses only after quickening
(roughly sixteen weeks of gestation). While many American states
did pass restrictive abortion laws in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, those laws applied only to termination of pregnancy, and
thus did not address the status of preimplantation embryos outside
the body. Wrongful death statutes did not compensate for the
103. See, e.g., Estate of Walker, 476 N.E.2d 298, 301 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1985) ("[A] testator may
dispose of his own body or direct the method or place of its burial, but he may not require that
he be buried in an unauthorized place."); see also Smart v. Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110 & n. 5 (Utah
1978) (stating in a footnote that the deceased had a sufficient "property interest" or "quasi-
property interest" such that instructions for disposal of the deceased's body should normally be
carried out).
104. That this premise is most accurately characterized as religious or philosophical rather
than legal does not necessarily detract from its force; however, as the text demonstrates, the
legitimacy of the assertion that these gametes, zygotes, pre-embryos, or embryos either are
human or should be treated identically to humans is immaterial to the analysis of whether they
may be bequeathed.
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wrongful death of a fetus until the late 1940s, and then only if the
fetus was viable at the time of the injury.
At the present time, then, the law does not regard embryos as
rights-bearing entities, although it has recognized that prenatal ac-
tions could affect the postnatal well-being of persons. In most states
the embryo is not a legal subject in its own right and is not protected
by laws against homicide or wrongful death, nor is embryo discard
prohibited....
The biology of early human development supports this legal sta-
tus. Since the embryo does not have differentiated organs, much
less the developed brain, nervous system, and capacity for sentience
that legal subjects ordinarily have, it cannot easily be regarded as a
legal subject. Indeed, the embryo is not yet individual, because
twinning or mosaicism can still occur.10 5
Second, while it is technically correct to say that one may not be-
queath human beings, the practical equivalent of that is actually en-
couraged by the law. In addition to jurisdiction over property in the
deceased's estate, probate courts also have jurisdiction over decisions
involving people when a will contains instructions regarding guardian-
ship of minors. 106 Giving effect to a testator's guardianship instruc-
tions can be seen as a vestige of ancient law which allowed the
bequeathing of minors because they were treated as property. 0 7 The
modern result is that the law effectively allows both property and mi-
nors to be bequeathed and inherited.10 8 Therefore, even if gametes,
zygotes, preembryos and embryos were treated as people instead of
property, the established legal principles dictate that a court attempt
to follow the testamentary wishes of the deceased regarding who is
given control over them. 10 9
105. ROBERTSON, supra note 50, at 103-04.
106. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 2200 (West 1996) ("The superior court has jurisdiction of
guardianship and conservatorship proceedings.").
107. Under Roman law a man's children belonged to him as chattel. See Francis Bowes Sayre,
Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. REV. 663, 664 (1923). A Roman father even had the
legal right to kill his child. IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS
491 (2d ed. 1991); see also FRANCES & JOSEPH GIES, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY IN THE MIDDLE
AGES 27 (1987) (noting that infanticide was common during the Roman era); Child = Chattel?,
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 6, 1995, at A22 (recounting recent cases in which courts essentially relied on the
traditional notion of children as property).
108. It is not my intention to downplay the importance of the distinction in terminology be-
tween bequeathing property and the appointment of a guardian for minors. The philosophical
values reflected in the use of different terms regarding ownership of property and the guardian-
ship of minors are of the utmost importance. However, the effect of the laws of inheritance and
the laws of guardianship are the same: the transfer of possession, control and responsibility from
one individual to another.
109. Obviously, courts apply different standards in evaluating whether to follow the wishes of
the deceased regarding children rather than property, but this is only relevant regarding who
should be given custody, not whether custody should be awarded at all.
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4. Considering Gametes, Zygotes, Preembryos and Embryos as
Sui Generis
Another initially attractive argument is that some or all of these
reproductive items are sui generis,110 and therefore new rules gov-
erning them, possibly including a ban on bequeathing them, are neces-
sary. An important distinction must be made at this point between
recognizing that these items are sui generis and declaring them to be
sui generis. This distinction is critical because while courts may recog-
nize that something does not fit into established legal categories, only
a legislature may create a new legal category. Further, for a court to
reach a conclusion that something is sui generis, the court must follow
a specific sequential analysis. It is in this context that the flawed ra-
tionale of the court in Davis v. Davis,"' that preembryos are sui
generis, provides an excellent opportunity for demonstrating the im-
portance of proper sui generis analysis.
Davis involved a couple seeking a divorce. 112 The parties agreed to
all terms of the dissolution except who was to have custody of seven
cryogenically preserved preembryos which were grown from Mrs. Da-
vis' eggs fertilized by Mr. Davis' sperm." 3 The trial court held that
the preembryos were human beings from the moment of conception
and awarded them to Mrs. Davis so that she would have "the opportu-
nity to bring these children to term through implantation.""14 The
court of appeals reversed, ordering the trial court to award joint con-
trol to the Davises so that they would have an equal voice in the dis-
position of the preembryos. 1 5 The court of appeals did not address
the legal nature of the preembryos but based its order on a holding
that Mr. Davis had a "constitutionally protected right not to beget a
child where no pregnancy has taken place.""16 By the time the case
reached the Tennessee Supreme Court, Mrs. Davis no longer wanted
to have the preembryos implanted in her uterus, but wished posses-
sion so that she could donate them to a childless couple. 1 7 Mr. Davis
continued to press for possession in order to have the preembryos
destroyed.11 8
110. This was the ruling in the Davis case which discussed the issue in the context of divorce
rather than the context of wills. See infra notes 113-135 and accompanying text.
111. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Stowe v. Davis, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
112. Id. at 589.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 590.
118. Id.
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After summarizing in less than one page what the court itself de-
scribed as "extensive comment and analysis [of the issue] in the legal
journals," 119 the Tennessee Supreme Court listed seven possible ap-
proaches, rejected them all without discussion, and concluded that the
only "fair and responsible manner ... [to resolve the dispute was to]
... weigh the interests of each party to the dispute. 1 120 The court then
recited the facts of the Davis' marriage and their unsuccessful efforts
at in vitro fertilization and the cryogenic storage of the preembryos
produced thereby.1 1 In the subsequent section labeled "Scientific
Testimony" the court evaluated the testimony concerning the biologi-
cal nature of preembryos.12 2 In evaluating the testimony the court re-
jected as scientifically unfounded the testimony that a preembryo is a
human being 2 3 and accepted the biologic distinction between an em-
bryo and a preembryo.' 2 4 However, while the court noted that the
distinction was not dispositive of the case, 25 it rejected the trial
court's reasoning that if there is no distinction between embryos and
preembryos, then the preembryos must be "children in vitro.112 6 De-
spite admitting that deciding the issue of whether "human life begins
at the moment of conception"'127 was neither necessary to the case nor
urged by either party, the court decided to address this issue "because
of its far-reaching implications in other cases of this kind."'21 8 Since
the nature of the preembryos was not an issue in the case, the court's
discussion of this matter is dictum.
Nonetheless, in section IV of the opinion the court addressed "The
'Person' vs. 'Property' Dichotomy.' 29 The court first observed that
preembryos are not "persons" under either Tennessee 30 or federal
law.' 3 ' The court then noted that while the appellate court recognized
119. Id.
120. Id. at 591.
121. Id. at 591-92.
122. Id. at 592-94.
123. Id. at 593.
124. Id. at 594.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. Other than this vague reference to "other cases of this kind," the court did not iden-
tify the cases it hoped to influence. In apparent self-contradiction later in the opinion, the court
referred to "the minuscule number of legal opinions that have involved 'frozen embryos"' but
these cases were not identified. Id. at 596. Thus, it is unclear why the court felt compelled to
write what, by its own admission, amounts to a mere advisory opinion on the legal status of
preembryos.
129. Id. at 594-97.
130. Id. at 594-95.
131. Id. at 595.
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that Mr. and Mrs. Davis both had "an interest" in the preembryos, the
lower court failed to define that interest precisely. 132 "For purposes of
clarity in future cases," the Tennessee Supreme Court stated, "we con-
clude that this point must be further addressed.' 33 At this point the
court dismissed without citing or discussing what it called the "minus-
cule number of legal opinions that have involved 'frozen embryos"1 34
and instead quoted from three pages of the Report of the Ethics Com-
mittee of the American Fertility Society. 135 That report called on the
operators of in vitro fertilization facilities to establish policies which
recognized in their implementation the view that a "preembryo de-
serves respect greater than that accorded to human tissue but not the
respect accorded to actual persons."'1 36
Evidently relying solely on the recommendation from the American
Fertility Society to in vitro fertilization facility operators, the court
concluded that preembryos were neither persons nor property but
"occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect be-
cause of their potential for human life. ' '137 With that, the court in ef-
fect concluded that preembryos were sui generis.138 The court then
stated that while this conclusion meant that the Davises could not
have a true property interest in the preembryos, they did have "an
interest in the nature of ownership to the extent that they have deci-
132. Id.
133. Id. at 596.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. A section of the Report of the Ethics Committee of the America Fertility Society
quoted by the Davis court stated:
Three major ethical positions have been articulated in the debate over preembryo
status. At one extreme is the view of the preembryo as a human subject after fertiliza-
tion, which requires that it be accorded the rights of a person. This position entails an
obligation to provide an opportunity for implantation to occur and tends to ban any
action before transfer that might harm the preembryo or that is not immediately thera-
peutic, such as freezing and some preembryo research.
At the opposite extreme is the view that the preembryo has a status no different from
any other human tissue. With the consent of those who have decision-making authority
over the preembryo, no limits should be imposed on actions taken with preembryos.
A third view-one that is most widely held-takes an intermediate position between
the other two. It holds that the preembryo deserves respect greater than that accorded
human tissue but not the respect accorded to actual persons. The preembryo is due
greater respect than other human tissue because of its potential to become a person
and because of its symbolic meaning for many people. Yet, it should not be treated as a
person, because it has not yet developed the features of personhood, is not yet estab-
lished as a developmental individual, and may never realize its biologic potential.
Id.
137. Id. at 597.
138. Id.
1998] REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY & INHERITANCE 769
sion-making authority concerning disposition of the preembryos."'1 39
Since the concepts of ownership and property are inextricably
linked, 140 the court was in effect concluding that the Davises had an
interest in the nature of a property interest. The appropriateness of
this conclusion is difficult to evaluate because the court made no dis-
tinction between the effects of an ownership interest and the effects of
an interest "in the nature of ownership." Yet, as William James ob-
served, if there is no distinction between the practical effect of two
categories, the two categories must be considered identical. 141 Thus,
the purported "interim category" between property and persons col-
lapses because the "interim category" is indistinguishable from "prop-
erty," and the court's dictum only serves to confuse the analysis.
Unfortunately, the court then compounded this confusion by suddenly
shifting the focus of its inquiry.
After declaring that preembryos occupy a sui generis category, the
Davis court summarily dropped the issue of the nature of the preem-
bryos and proceeded to compare the degree of decision making au-
thority the parties had over the preembryos. 142 By making decision
making authority the basis of its decision, though, the court rendered
any discussion of the nature of the preembryos irrelevant. The Davis
court then quickly determined that both parties had equal decision
making authority, and that, therefore, comparison of the parties' re-
spective procreational rights was the proper basis for deciding the dis-
pute over the preembryos.143 In addressing this issue the court
immediately admitted that "[a]lthough an understanding of the legal
status of preembryos is necessary in order to determine the enforce-
ability of agreements about their disposition, asking whether or not
they constitute 'property' is not an altogether helpful question.' ' 44
Although the Davis court's inquiry into decision making authority
and the legal status of the preembryos was apparently intended to de-
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 73-78.
141. WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM 23-25 (1991). James' pragmatic method tests purported
distinctions by drawing the respective practical consequence of each alternative. Id. That is,
"what difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were
true? If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically
the same thing, and all dispute is idle." Id. at 23. "There can be no difference anywhere that
doesn't make a difference elsewhere." Id. at 25 (emphasis in original.)
142. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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termine whether the preembryos could be the subject of a contract, 145
the analysis is complete as soon as one concludes that preembryos are
in the category of things that may be the subject of a valid contract.
Further inquiry into the nature of preembryos as property or an in-
terim category between property and people is unnecessary and inap-
propriate. As a result, the dicta in Davis regarding the legal nature of
preembryos provides neither persuasive rationale nor legal authority
that preembryos are sui generis.
Of course, the failure of the Davis opinion to provide guidance in
this area does not mean that preembryos (as well as gametes, zygotes,
and embryos) are not a sui generis category between persons and
property; proper sui generis analysis, though, is a four-step process.
First, the items in question must be shown to possess traits that justify
recognition that they are distinct from existing categories of legal clas-
sification. 146 Second, once something has been shown to be properly
sui generis, the courts have historically used that recognition to refrain
from applying the entire body of law of the category originally pre-
sumed to apply. 147 One might then assume that a court would be free
to apply new rules to the sui generis; but however logical this assump-
tion is, it is incorrect. Historically, the third step has been to apply
only those rules that had already developed regarding the item now
recognized as sui generis.148 Thus, recognizing something as sui
145. Id. The court ultimately based its "custody" decision on the procreational rights of the
parties. Id. at 604. This is a subject which is irrelevant to this article's examination of the state of
the law with regard to the ability of a decedent to bequeath items such as frozen preembryos.
146. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992) (the Roe v. Wade deci-
sion); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 153 (1987) (RICO); Grove
City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573 (1984) (student financial aid programs in comparison to
earmarked direct grants); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (canine sniff searches);
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 425 (1973) (the District of Columbia); United States
v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 405 U.S. 298, 310 (1972) (Class C Stock); Frank v. United States, 395
U.S. 147, 151 (1968) (criminal contempt proceedings); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379
(1963) (criminal contempt proceedings); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 139-40 (1953) (military
habeas corpus applications in civil courts); Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598, 605 (1937) (lease
covenants); Lang v. Commissioner, 289 U.S. 109, 111 (1933) (joint tenancy); Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421, 431 (1932) (criminal contempt proceedings); Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S.
87, 117 (1924) (criminal contempt proceedings); Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 103 (1924)
(criminal contempt proceedings); Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. County of King, 264 U.S.
22, 27 (1924) (street railway); The Minnesota, 230 U.S. 352, 453 (1912) (railroad right-of-way); In
re Wood, 210 U.S. 246, 253 (1908) (section 60d of the Bankruptcy Act); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey
Co., 194 U.S. 324, 326 (1905) (criminal contempt proceedings); O'Neal v. United States, 190 U.S.
36, 38 (1903) (criminal contempt proceedings); The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110, 118 (1897) (ves-
sels); Robertson v. Rosenthal, 132 U.S. 460, 464 (1889) (hair-pins in relation to the tariff acts);
Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 104 U.S. 662, 665 (1881) (land-grant railroad company);
Randall v. Kreiger, 90 U.S. 137, 147 (1874) (marriage).
147. See supra note 146.
148. See supra note 138.
1998] REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY & INHERITANCE 771
generis does not allow a court the unfettered freedom to fashion a new
legal regime for it. At this point, if existing laws do not apply, a court
must proceed to the fourth step: carrying out the court's traditional
function of looking to analogous examples for guidance.
149
Proceeding along the steps described above, gametes, zygotes,
preembryos and embryos must first be shown to possess unique traits
sufficient to justify a recognition that they do not belong in any ex-
isting legal category. As pointed out both by courts150 and commenta-
tors,1 51 there is neither legal nor scientific justification for recognizing
any of the items as people.152 As examined at length above, a power-
ful argument exists for recognizing that these items are property.
153
A New York trial court decision which also involved a divorce ac-
tion came the closest to the proper starting point of the "person" vs.
"property" analysis. 54 In Kass v. Kass,155 Justice Roncallo considered
a divorce dispute over custody of five frozen preembryos-to which
149. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 858.
150. See, e.g., Hecht v. Kane, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283 (Ct. App. 1993); Davis, 842 S.W.2d at
597.
151. See, e.g., Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Personalizing Personalty: Toward a Property Right in
Human Beings, 69 TEX. L. REv. 209, 220 (1990).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 105-110. In fact, considerable practical and concep-
tual problems arise if the items are considered persons. For example, if the woman who pro-
vided the egg dies before the resulting offspring is born, should that child be treated as having
been adopted by the woman who brings the child to term? Should there be an adoption proce-
dure before implantation is permitted? If the implantation is treated as an adoption, would this
cut off inheritance rights from the biological mother or can the child inherit from two sources:
their biological and their birth mother? Similarly in the Hecht/Kane situation: would the result-
ing offspring be treated as having been adopted by Ms. Hecht upon implantation (or birth) and
therefore without the right to inherit from Mr. Kane?
Further, if the reproductive material is considered a person, that status would conflict with
current statutes which grant only contingent rights prior to birth. See infra notes 261-263 and
accompanying text.
Finally, if the reproductive material is considered a person prior to birth, then the Rule
Against Perpetuities would be essentially eviscerated because the frozen zygote, preembryo, or
embryo would be a life in being with theoretically perpetual life. Cryostorage of one or more
zygotes could then be used as an estate planning device to circumvent the rule. See Wendy
Dullea Bowie, Comment, Multiplication and Division-New Math for the Courts: New Repro-
ductive Technologies Create Potential Legal Time Bombs, 95 DICK. L. Rav. 155, 175-76 (1990).
These are not simply difficult questions; these questions defy both legislative and judicial solu-
tion. A satisfactory statutory solution predicated on the concept that gametes, zygotes, preem-
bryos, and embryos are the equivalent of or analogous to persons would have to be both very
detailed and devoid of political influence. Few would seriously contend this was possible. In the
absence of well-considered legislation, courts would be required to create, piecemeal, an entire
legal structure which details just how "analogous" to persons these items are.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 73-78.
154. Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995), rev'd, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581
(N.Y. App. Dec. 1997).
155. Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995), rev'd, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581
(N.Y. App. Dec. 1997).
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the court also referred as "zygotes"-in which all issues other than
possession of the preembryos had been resolved. 156 Although the
court characterized the issue as one of classifying the preembryos as
either persons or property,157 a close reading of the decision reveals a
more subtle analysis. After rejecting the possibility that the preem-
bryos were "persons,"'158 the court made the following assertion:
The fact that the zygotes are not persons ... does not establish that
they are within the ordinary sense of that term. They most assuredly
are not. As life inchoate they represent the ultimate in nascency
and potentiality. Equating zygotes with washing machines and jew-
elry for purposes of marital distribution borders on the absurd. The
issues involved transcend such a context.159
The italicized portions of the excerpt point out that the court did in-
deed assume that the preembryos were property but that the tradi-
tional analysis for determining who should possess the property was
inappropriate. That the court considered the preembryos property is
evidenced by the fact that the court ultimately awarded what was es-
sentially ownership of them to Maureen Kass.a60 Thus, the Kass deci-
sion focused not on the nature of the preembryos as property or
persons, but on fashioning new rules regarding awarding possession of
a special type of property. In other words, Justice Roncallo implicitly
ruled that the preembryos were "property" (they exist and are suscep-
tible of ownership) but that the preembryos were a unique type of
property deserving of a unique analysis to determine who is entitled to
possess them.16'
Even though the Kass opinion subsumes the proper starting point,
no court has fully or correctly assessed whether gametes, zygotes,
preembryos or embryos possess characteristics that justify the conclu-
sion that they are neither people nor property. Therefore, for the pur-
pose of illustration, it will be assumed that such a distinction can be
156. Id. at *1.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. (emphasis added.)
160. Id. at *4. "Accordingly, it is my determination that plaintiff, if she so elects, is entitled to
take possession of the five (5) zygotes ...for purposes of attempting conception, any such
attempt to be made within a medically reasonable time after entry of the judgment." Id. Be-
cause Mr. Kass had sought possession to prevent conception, the court's ruling was tantamount
to awarding unconditional posession to Maureen Kass. The Kass decision was reversed on ap-
peal; however, the apellate court did not address the issue of the nature of the pre-zygotes.
Instead, the court focused on the competing rights regarding forced and voluntary parenthood.
Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 587 (N.Y. App. Dec. 1997).
161. Id. at *2. As Justice Roncallo acknowledged in his opinion, his analysis was restricted to
possession of the preembryos "for purposes of marital distribution." Id. at *1.
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made (i.e., that these items are neither persons nor property) and that
the first step in the sui generis analysis can be thereby completed. 162
The second step in the sui generis analysis is simple: the court re-
frains from applying the entire body of law that one would have other-
wise assumed applied. Curiously, despite having this freedom, neither
of the courts which have concluded that reproductive items are sui
generis (i.e., neither persons nor property) have exercised it.163
Although both Hecht and Davis concluded that sperm and preem-
bryos, respectively, were sui generis and refused to apply the law ap-
plicable to living persons, both courts applied property law principles
in toto to these items. 164
The third step in a sui generis analysis is the application of existing
rules that have already been applied to the sui generis item.165 For
example, the Unites States Supreme Court declared marriage con-
tracts to be sui generis as agreements between adults and refused to
apply the entire body of contract law to them.' 66 However, the Court
nevertheless was still able to rely on a large body of law that had al-
ready developed regarding marriage contracts. In the case of ga-
metes, zygotes, preembryos and embryos, though, no part of any body
of law can be viewed as uniquely applicable. The issue is too new and
has yet to be correctly analyzed by the courts.
Lacking any existing jurisprudential rules, the fourth step in ad-
dressing a sui generis item is to follow the traditional judicial approach
of looking to existing analogies for guidance.1 67 In the area of repro-
ductive technology and genetic material, commentators have ex-
amined analogies to blood,168 tissue,'169 and organs.170
162. For example, a characteristic which is commonly emphasized as a justification for sui
generis classification of reproductive items is their potential for development into human beings.
See, e.g., Hecht v. Kane, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283 (Ct. App. 1993); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d
588, 596 (Tenn. 1992); Philippe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REV.
195, 210-11 (1996); William Bonlier, Note, Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables: The Need to
Recognize Property Rights in Human Body Parts, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 700-01 (1995); see
also supra text accompanying notes 105-110.
163. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 281-84; Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597. But see, e.g., Kass, 1995 WL
110368 at *2. The Kass decision of course did evidently consider preembryos to be a sui generis
category of property in terms of the analysis of who should possess them, but the court did not
rule that preembryos were distinct from property or persons. Id. at *1.
164. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 281-84; Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
165. Randall v. Kreiger, 90 U.S. 137, 147 (1874).
166. Id.
167. Anne Reichman Schiff, Solomonic Decisions in Egg Donation: Unscrambling the Conun-
drum of Legal Maternity, 80 IOWA L. REv. 265, 291-92 (1995). While it is possible to look at the
Hecht and Davis cases as applying the law of property by analogy to these items, in actuality,
Hecht relied on Davis without explanation and Davis relied on property law without explana-
tion. See supra notes 37-46, 137-142 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Ducor, supra note 162, at 254.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Gametes, zygotes, preembryos and embryos cannot be considered
analogous to organs because none of these items carry out specific
system functions as do organs. Even if such an analogy to organs were
forced, the fact that the sale of organs is the subject of national legisla-
tion indicates that without legislation prohibiting it, the sale of organs
would be legal. Therefore, this analogy leads to the conclusion that in
the absence of prohibiting legislation the transfer, including the sale or
bequest, of any of these items is legal.
Since gametes, zygotes, preembryos and embryos are themselves
either carried or supported by fluids, an analogy to the medium of
blood does not fit well either. Analogizing these items to individual
blood cells is flawed since only gametes remain uni-cellular. Further,
blood cells have no potential beyond blood cells; thus making them
inherently distinct from gametes and all subsequent stages of gametic
and zygotic development. The most fitting analogy would seem to be
human tissue which can continue to grow yet does not constitute sepa-
rate organs. Of course, the inability of tissue to develop into a human
being is the critical difference that destroys the legitimacy of this anal-
ogy. Moreover, while there are some statutory restrictions regarding
organ sales,'171 there are no common law restrictions on the sale of
blood, fluid or tissue. In fact, all three are routinely sold and
donated. 172 Thus, even if an analogy to human blood, fluid, or tissue
were proper, that analogy leads to the conclusion that no restriction
on bequeathing these items is appropriate.
Nonetheless, the purpose of the search for an analogy is to obtain
guidance from existing legal rules. That requires that the things which
are compared be similar in their essential nature rather than their sur-
face characteristics. If one assumes that gametes, zygotes, preembryos
and embryos are properly considered sui generis due to their potential
for development into a human being,173 then except in the case of
gametes, no guidance is provided by analogies to existing treatment of
any biological products of the human body because none of these has
169. See, e.g., Barry Brown, Reconciling Property Law with Advances in Reproductive Science,
6 STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 73, 74-75 (1995).
170. Id. at 74.
171. See, e.g., National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1994); UNIF. ANATOMICAL
GIFr Act § 10, 8A U.L.A. 58 (1987).
172. The sale of blood or blood plasma is routine and widespread. Sales of sperm to sperm
banks is also commonplace. Both blood and sperm are covered by the National Organ Trans-
plant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1) and the UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GiFr ACT § 1(7). See Ducor,
supra note 162, at 254. While tissue sales by individuals are less common, the situation in Moore
indicates that the hospital was entitled to sell the tissue to various laboratories and that Moore
himself could have sold the tissue had he not relinquished possession of it unconditionally.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 105-110.
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the inherent ability to develop into a human being. Further, gametes
themselves can only be considered similar to zygotes, preembryos, and
embryos if the distinguishing characteristic of this class of objects is
described as contributing to the genetic development of a potential
human being rather than possessing itself the potential to develop into
a human being. Playing with the wording of the description of the sui
generis category in this fashion reveals the problem with resorting to
the sui generis analysis: does the distinction arise from the nature of
the thing in question or does it arise from the teleological desires of
the taxonomist? Thus, the conclusion that these items are sui generis
leaves a court with neither directly applicable legal precedent nor
analogy to legal precedent. 174
The current state of the law indicates that regardless of whether
gametes, zygotes, preembryos and embryos are classified as prop-
erty,175 or are analogized to humans,17 6 or considered products of
human biology,1 77 they may be bequeathed according to the de-
ceased's instructions.1 78 However, this conclusion regarding the state
of the law does not resolve the issue of whether such bequests can or
should be restricted or prohibited by judicial decision.
5. Judicial Restrictions Based on Public Policy
Unlike the foregoing analysis of case law which sought to determine
the existing state of the law in this area, determining whether such
bequests should be restricted is normally a legislative decision. How-
ever, a potentially legitimate judicial basis for prohibiting such trans-
fers would be public policy.1 79 The appropriateness of using public
policy to prevent the bequeathing of these items requires a brief ex-
amination of how Western society has valued the concept of be-
queathing property.
The notion that an individual has the right to bequeath property is
an ancient, fundamental principle in Western society, and therefore it
should not be infringed without a compelling reason. 80 For instance,
174. As the California Supreme Court noted, establishing sui generis categories is typically
accomplished by specialized legislation. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 793 P.2d 479,
489 (Cal. 1990).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 59-86.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 104-10.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 168-75.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 91-104.
179. It is important to note here that public policy has been used as a basis for withholding
legal recognition of certain transactions. Public policy concerns do not permit a court to either
create a new category of legal recognition or declare something sui generis.
180. See Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68
IND. L.J. 1, 6-9 (1992).
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the Romans held that the right to bequeath property was a natural
right. 181 John Locke considered the right of devise to be a logical de-
velopment of the natural drive of self-preservation and self-propaga-
tion, giving "Children a Title, to share in the Property of their Parents,
and a Right to Inherit their Possessions.118 2 Locke also described be-
queathing property as a responsibility that "God and Nature has...
obliged Parents to, as a Duty.' 83 In The Metaphysics of Morals,184
Immanuel Kant strongly implied that inheritance was a natural right
when he explained how such acquisition of property was "based on a
mere Idea of pure reason."'1 85 Kant's subsequent discussions of the
transfer of property at death without interruption of ownership 86 are
also based on that notion that the right to transfer property at death is
a product of pure reason. 187
While others have disagreed with both the application of the idea of
a natural right to bequeath 88 as well as its premise, 89 other rationales
supporting the right developed. Jeremy Bentham, for example, ar-
gued that the right to bequeath keeps the younger generation atten-
tive to the care and needs of the aging generation. 90 On the other
181. See LuIoI MIRAGLIA, COMPARATIVE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 732-37, 741-42 (John Lisle
trans., 1912).
182. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 206-07, 227-28 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960)
(emphasis in original).
183. Id. at 225.
184. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor trans., 1991).
185. Id. at 108 (emphasis in original).
186. Id. at 74-75.
187. Id. at 132-33.
188. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 10-12
(Oxford 2d ed., 1767) (stating that, at death, the individual lost all right to the property and so
had no natural right to bequeath it, the right to bequeath property only being granted to main-
tain the peace).
189. In his Examination of the Declaration of Rights Issued During the French Revolution,
Bentham declared that there were no natural rights of any kind: "Natural rights is simple non-
sense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense-nonsense upon stilts." JEREMY
BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 501 (John Bowring ed.,
1962). Later in that same work Bentham intimates that there are in fact "natural" restrictions on
the right to bequeath: "Are there no necessary limits to the employment of [a man's] property?
Ought a man to have the right of establishing after his death, either religious or anti-religious
foundations at the expense of his family? Ought not the law to hinder an individual from disin-
heriting his children without cause assigned?" Id at 532-33. Nonetheless, in THE THEORY OF
LEGISLATION, Bentham declared that inheritance was a civil right that should not be extensively
regulated. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 184 (1950).
190. RONALD CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH, AND SOCIETY 18-20 (1982). It is at least
marginally relevant here that Bentham left specific instruction as to what should be done with
his body following his death. VIRGIL M. HARRIS, ANCIENT, CURIOUS AND FAMOUS WILLS 138
(1911). Bentham bequeathed his body to his favorite disciple, Dr. Southwood Smith, with addi-
tional instructions that "his preserved figure might be placed in a chair at the banquet-table of
his friends and disciples when they met on any great occasions of philosophy and philanthropy."
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hand, many have noted that the right to bequeath is an incentive to
industry and saving.191 Furthermore, several commentators have ad-
dressed the practical concerns raised by the great difficulty in enforc-
ing a prohibition on inheritance. 192 Finally, while numerous
arguments on both sides of the question have addressed the economic
desirability of the right to pass property at death,193 the fact is that,
with the exception of a brief period in Russia following the Commu-
nist Revolution, 194 the general right to bequeath has not been re-
stricted by any Western nation.195 Thus, to prohibit the bequeathing
of these items would require public policy reasons powerful enough to
overwhelm a Western tradition that has persisted for over 2,000 years.
With regard to the bequeathing of gametes, zygotes, preembryos
and embryos, the arguments advancing a natural right to bequeath
frequently implicate the impracticality of enforcing such a ban. In-
deed, since the likely effect of a ban on such bequests would be to
force people to place the cryopreserved item in trust for a named sur-
vivor beneficiary, a ban on inter vivos transfer to a trust would also be
required. However, banning such transfers would require court in-
spection of trusts to the same degree courts are involved in probate
matters. That difficulty would be compounded by the fact that, unlike
wills, trusts are not public documents and, unlike wills, do not nor-
mally require judicial administration. While certainly possible, the im-
practicality of court oversight in this area is probably decisive.
Ultimately, though, one must realize that at least part of the reason
why society has repeatedly attempted to follow the instructions of the
deceased is the desire to provide the living with some assurance that
their wishes will be honored after their death. Regardless of whether
one feels that reproduction is less important to the dead than to the
living, the issue that must be considered in any public policy debate is
After storing Mr. Bentham in a room of his house in Finsbury Square for several years, Dr.
Southwood gave the "Bentham exhibit" to University College. Id. at 138-39. The author has not
been able to ascertain the further adventures of Mr. Bentham's remains.
191. EDWARD C. HALBACH, JR., DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY: ESSAYS AND AMER-
ICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT 5-7 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977).
192. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSEN, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 14 (5th
ed. 1995); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 180, at 11-12.
193. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 180, at 8-11.
194. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSEY, supra note 192, at 16.
195. While estates are taxed to various degrees, this is a restriction on the amount of property
an individual may bequeath; United States law has never tolerated complete restriction on the
right of an individual to bequeath a particular type of property in their estate. In fact, it was
exactly that kind of total bar on bequeathing a particular type of property that the United States
Supreme Court ruled would be in violation of the 5th Amendment because the property would
escheat to the state without compensation. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717 (1987).
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the comfort of the living in knowing that their wishes for reproduction
will be carried out as directed. In the absence of a clearly articulated
public policy reason, the instructions of the deceased involving
parenthood, even though posthumous, should be followed. 196
6. Fundamental Right to Procreate
Assuming that one rejects the natural law arguments and that the
practical problems of oversight of inter vivos and at-death transfers
could be overcome, one must consider whether the United States
Constitution protects the transfer of gametes, zygotes, preembryos
and embryos, for even public policy arguments fail in light of constitu-
tional protections. Restrictions on the bequest and inheritance of
these items raise the question of whether there is a constitutional right
to procreate that would be violated by such restrictions.
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has never recognized a fundamen-
tal right to procreate. In fact, in Buck v. Bell,197 the Court, on the
grounds of protecting the general public, upheld a law that permitted
the involuntary sterilization of an allegedly retarded woman. 198 Ad-
mittedly, the Buck ruling would almost certainly not be applied to
marital reproduction.199 However, since modern technology readily
permits variations on reproduction that include not only posthumous
reproduction but also conceiving a child of a particular deceased indi-
vidual, the issue is whether there is a fundamental right to posthu-
mous reproduction (thereby protecting the bequest), or a fundamental
right of reproduction that includes the right to select specific repro-
ductive material (thereby protecting the inheritance).
In several cases the Court has recognized Constitutional rights that
are closely related to a fundamental right to reproduce. As one com-
mentator has pointed out,20 0 Court opinions have implied such a right
since 1923,201 and recent opinions indicate that if required to face the
question directly, the Court would find that such a fundamental right
196. See supra note 103.
197. 274 U.S. 200 (1927)
198. Id. at 207. The Buck case dealt with a retarded woman who had been born of a retarded
mother and who had already given birth to a retarded child. Id. at 205. The involuntary sterili-
zation was intended to permit the woman to be released from a state institution and be re-
integrated into society without fear that future offspring would burden the state. Id. at 206. In
ruling that the Fourteenth Amendment provided no protection against involuntary sterilization
in such circumstances, Justice Holmes made the infamous observation: "Three generations of
imbeciles are enough." Id. at 207.
199. See ROBERTSON, supra note 50, at 36 n.39.
200. Id. at 35-36.
201. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942).
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to reproduction exists.202 The Court has also emphasized that issues
involving the right of procreation necessarily involve the "right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmen-
tal intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child. 2
0 3
Assuming that a fundamental constitutional right to procreate ex-
ists, whether that right survives death is unlikely. The Supreme Court
has never held that an individual's constitutional rights survive one's
death. Of course, the distinction that can be made in situations in-
volving possible posthumous children is that, unlike other fundamen-
tal rights, a fundamental right to procreate could be carried out after
one's death. Regardless of that distinction, though, the likelihood that
the Court would decide that a fundamental right to procreate survives
one's death must be considered remote. Therefore, prohibiting the
bequest of reproductive material would not appear to impinge on a
fundamental constitutional right.
Yet, a fundamental right to procreate might protect such bequests
from the perspective of the person to inherit.2°4 It may be possible to
argue successfully that preventing the inheritance of the reproductive
material impinges on the fundamental right to procreate of the person
named to inherit. The question that remains to be resolved, though, is
whether the fundamental right to procreate encompasses an individ-
ual's decision to procreate with specific genetic material. It would
seem that if the decision to procreate is protected, then the state can-
not restrict with whom (or with whose genetic material) one chooses
to procreate, so long as the other individual has consented to the pro-
creation.205 However, unless the actual transfer is conditioned in light
202. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("Our law affords constitutional
protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relation-
ships, childrearing and education .... These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651 (1972) ("The rights to conceive and raise one's children have been deemed 'essential'
. . . 'basic civil rights of man' . . . and '[r]ights far more precious ... than property rights."');
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (noting that a statute intending to limit contracep-
tion is in conflict with "fundamental human rights.").
203. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
204. It appears that, unless the right to procreate encompasses being pregnant as opposed to
producing a child with one's own genetic material, only gametes would be at issue in this situa-
tion because the focus is on the right of the living individual to procreate rather than to bear a
child. Procreation, of course, could only be accomplished by combining a gamete from the de-
ceased with a gamete from the person who is to inherit.
205. The fundamental right to select with whom one chooses to engage in procreational activ-
ity is the basis for the Supreme Court's ruling invalidating anti-miscegenation statutes. See Lov-
ing v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("[T]here can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to
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of the right to procreate, then what is being protected is not the right
to procreate, but the general right to inherit or the right to possess
property, neither of which is a fundamental right. In order to ensure
that inheriting the property is based on a right to procreate, the pro-
bate court would have to restrict the transfer to circumstances which
are reproductive in nature.206
The unavoidable fact though is that cryogenically preserved ga-
metes, zygotes, preembryos and embryos must go somewhere at the
decedent's death. Restricting the right to devise gametes, zygotes,
preembryos and embryos simply re-directs the transfer from the dece-
dent's heirs to the State.207
Currently, no state or federal law prohibits bequeathing gametes,
zygotes, preembryos or embryos. Moreover, while a state may regu-
late the bequeathing of reproductive material to some degree,20 8 no
public policy reason has been articulated against allowing such be-
quests. Thus, no compelling justification for judicial prohibition of the
bequeathing of these items exists. That gametes, zygotes, preembryos
and embryos are property and may be bequeathed, though, merely
moves the inquiry past the threshold questions. The following section
examines what the effects of such bequests may be.
II. THE EFFECTS OF BEQUEATHING GAMETES, ZYGOTES,
PREEM3RYOS AND EMBRYOS
Affirmatively answering the question of whether gametes, zygotes,
preembryos and embryos may be bequeathed leads to consideration
of the issues surrounding such bequests. These issues involve not only
the rights of the eventual posthumous child, but also rights of other
heirs, the gestational host (whether biological or birth mother), and
the various reproductive items themselves.
marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause."). Other courts have invalidated anti-fornication statutes. See generally Susan Clement,
et al., Note, The Evolution of the Right to Privacy After Roe v. Wade, 13 AM. J.L. MED. 365, 470
(1987) (citing Doe v. Duling, 603 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Va. 1985); State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d. 333
(N.J. 1977)). "Courts have found that the fundamental right to privacy encompasses the right to
engage in private consensual, nonprostitutional, heterosexual fornication." Id.
206. The term "reproductive in nature" refers to circumstances in which procreation is clearly
possible. Hence, the gametes of the testator would be brought into contact with the gamete(s) of
the heir either through artificial or in vitro fertilization, and zygotes of the testator would be
implanted in the heir or a surrogate.
207. while it would be possible to prohibit the devise of these items and not have the property
go to the state, this would render it abandoned property available to the first person to take
possession of it. Because this would merely change the underlying theory of the transfer of the
property rather than prevent it, there seems little logic to adopting it.
208. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987).
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A. Problems of Parentage
1. Conception and Paternity
When gametes, zygotes, preembryos and embryos are bequeathed,
the inheritance rights of the posthumous children who may eventually
be born must be examined. The first issue that must be considered is
the extension of the presumption that a child born during a marriage
is a child of that marriage. 209 In many states this presumption is ex-
tended to include posthumous children, children born after the death
of their mother's husband.
Posthumous children statutes take two forms. The first type refers
to children conceived during the marriage,210 while the second type
refers to children born within ten months or 300 days of the husband's
death.211 While other states do not have a statutory presumption cov-
ering posthumous children, those states nonetheless allow such chil-
dren to prove the paternity of their deceased father. 212 Extreme
posthumous children,21 3 however, complicate the operation of both
types of statutes. 21 4 The following sections address this issue for the
various reproductive stages under consideration.
a. Gametes
Gametes must be distinguished from the other items at this point
for practical as well as biological and perhaps philosophical reasons.
Gametes are, by definition and biology, not fertilized and, therefore,
conception must be a future event. Statutes which restrict the pre-
sumption of paternity to children conceived during the marriage elimi-
209. WILLIAM A. McGOVERN, JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 2.1, at 35 (1988).
210. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206 (1995).
211. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-5 (1996) (300 days); OKL. STAT. tit. 10, § 2 (1996) (ten
months). One state, Minnesota, has a 280-day period. MINN. STAT. § 257.55 (1996).
212. See, e.g., CoRN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-438 (1997) (permitting proof of paternity after the
father's death by showing "clear and convincing evidence that the father has acknowledged in
writing that he is the father of the child and has openly treated the child as his"); FLA. STAT. ch.
732.108 (1997) (permitting proof of paternity after the father's death for the purpose of intestate
succession).
213. The term "extreme posthumous children" is used here with some frustration at the limits
of language in the face of new technology. Nonetheless, the term adequately conveys the cir-
cumstance of a deceased individual's child born after the child could have been naturally con-
ceived and born.
214. The phenomenon of single women using artificial insemination to become mothers is
becoming so widespread that in many instances, women are accomplishing artificial insemination
without resorting to medical procedures. See, e.g., Wikler & Wikler, supra note 11, at 5. If the
use of artificial insemination by single women is increasing, the motivation in this regard would
likely be all the more for a recently widowed woman. See also text accompanying notes 85-88
(recounting efforts by recently widowed women to harvest their dead husband's sperm).
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nate paternity complications arising from posthumous children who
are born of the frozen sperm of their deceased father.
However, posthumous children statutes that refer to children born
within a certain time after their father's death focus on the timing of
birth rather than the circumstance of conception. These statutes allow
the donor's widow to decide after the donor's death whether to pro-
ceed with artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization within 3-4
weeks of the death of her husband in order to gain the benefit of the
presumption. This situation also permits the presumption to apply to
pregnancies resulting from sperm harvested from the deceased. 215
Since a child born within ten months of the death of its mother's hus-
band benefits from the presumption, the sperm donor's death may be
the catalyst for a decision regarding implantation.
While there is little cause for concern that some people who were
not intended to be covered by such statutes may benefit from them,
these situations nonetheless raise constitutional concerns. Since re-
productive technology allows some to benefit from the presumption as
a result of the proximity of their birth to their father's death, rather
than as a result of conception, the question of whether such a statu-
tory distinction has a rational basis arises. It is difficult to discern the
rational basis for distinguishing between a child conceived one day
after her father's death who is born within the statutory period, and a
child conceived one month after her father's death who is born
outside the statutory period. When one considers that such a distinc-
tion actually encourages premature delivery in order to benefit from
the presumption, the possibility of a rational basis appears remote.
Prior to the widespread availability of cryogenic storage and artificial
insemination, laws regarding posthumous children could meet the ra-
tional basis test by the simple fact that ten months or 300 days is a
period of time that corresponds to a typical gestation period. The ap-
plication of current cryogenic technology, though, has eliminated that
rational basis. This is not to suggest that there would be a mob of
mothers rushing to have their children born prematurely merely to
gain the benefit of the presumption, but this extreme scenario is not
necessary to undermine any purported rational basis. The mere fact
that the distinction would encourage such action could well be suffi-
cient to demonstrate the irrationality of the statute, regardless of
whether anyone actually acts on that encouragement. 216
215. See supra note 8 and text accompanying notes 85-88.
216. The only remaining rational purpose for such a statute would be ease of administration,
but this should be outweighed by the potential of successfully encouraging premature delivery.
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If no constitutional distinction is possible, then statutes providing
the ten month/300 day period presumption of paternity are unconsti-
tutional regardless of whether they are viewed as either an extension
or a limitation of the presumption of paternity. The availability of
cryotechnology and the increasing likelihood of extreme posthumous
children apparently lead to only two alternatives: either no child born
after its father's death may benefit from the presumption, or all pos-
thumous children must be presumed to be the product of their
mother's late husband. Invalidating such statutes would not be a ca-
tastrophe since testimony of the child's mother, coupled with the rele-
vant death and birth certificates, should be sufficient to establish
paternity. Indeed, since obtaining the current presumption requires
proof of death and birth dates, the loss of the statutory presumption
would have little practical effect.
b. Zygotes, Preembryos and Embryos
In those states which create a presumption of paternity based on
conception during the marriage, the effect of the laws governing pre-
sumption of paternity changes considerably once fertilization of the
egg occurs. Under the terms of these statutes, if an egg is fertilized
and frozen before the husband dies, then the posthumous child will be
presumed to be the child of the deceased father regardless of the du-
ration of the interval between death of the father and birth of the
child. In this situation the presumption of paternity becomes very im-
portant.2 17 While in the absence of a presumption it is still possible to
show paternity through a chain of custody, only a negative result from
a DNA comparison would overcome a presumption of paternity in
these cases. This is important because as a result of normal biological
decay the availability of DNA evidence to disprove paternity would
diminish over time; the longer the time between the death of the fa-
ther and the posthumous birth, the greater the likelihood that the pre-
sumption of paternity would be effectively irrebuttable.
Obtaining the presumption may prove problematic, though. Rather
than relying on the mother's testimony regarding the timing of sexual
relations and proof of the child's date of birth as evidence sufficient to
217. For example, the Social Security Administration recently reversed an appeals panel deci-
sion applying state law and extended benefits to a child conceived through artificial insemination
after her father's death. Bureaucracy Finally Yields to Science, DENVER POST, Mar. 12, 1996, at
A5, available in LEXIS, News Library, Dpost File. However, Social Security Commissioner
Shirley Chater stated that the decision would be limited to that case while changes in the law
were considered. Id.
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gain the presumption of paternity, 18 the widow would probably have
to provide evidence of in vitro fertilization, cryopreservation, the tim-
ing of the implantation procedure, and the date of birth. Given that
normally the mother would be the only party who would know
whether the attempted implantation was successful, only DNA evi-
dence could rebut the presumption.
c. The Problem of Legitimacy
A different situation arises with regard to proving paternity if no
presumption of paternity applies. If extreme posthumous children are
not presumed to be children of the deceased father, and their mother
has not remarried, then until they can prove paternity these children
will be illegitimate, with no inheritance rights regarding their biologi-
cal father. While some states only require proof of paternity by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence,2 19 most states impose a higher burden.
In fact, many states require proof by clear and convincing evidence, 220
while other states require either proof of the alleged father's conduct
indicating paternity, or proof of acknowledgment during the father's
life.221
Meeting a burden of preponderance of the evidence in these situa-
tions should not be difficult. In the case of a living potential father,
paternity is typically established through a comparison of blood or
DNA from the potential father and the possible offspring.22 2 In the
case of a claim by a posthumous child, if blood or DNA matching is
not possible, proof of paternity by a preponderance of the evidence
could be accomplished by establishing a chain of custody of the ge-
218. See, e.g., Tierce v. Ellis, 624 So. 2d 553 (Ala. 1993); In re R.T.L., 780 P.2d 508 (Colo.
1989); RM v. State Dept. of Family Serv., 891 P.2d 791 (Wyo. 1995).
219. McGOVERN, supra note 209, at 39.
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., Charles Nelson LeRay, Note, Implications of DNA Technology on Posthumous
Paternity Determination: Deciding the Facts when Daddy Can't Give His Opinion, 35 B.C. L.
REV. 747, 748 (1994); Robert Silverman, Comment, Inheritance Rights of Non-Marital Children
Under Michigan's 1993 Probate Code Changes, 1995 DET. C.L. REV. 1123, 1132 (1995). These
statutes vary widely in the burden they impose. For example, CALIFOrNI1A FAMILY CODE sec-
tion 7611 creates a presumption of paternity based on the alleged father's conduct toward the
child (e.g., taking the child into his home, openly holding the child out as his natural child). CAL.
FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 1997) Other states require written acknowledgment or a court order
during the alleged father's life. See, e.g., WiS. STAT. § 852.05 (1991). Section 852.05 provides:
A nonmarital child ... is entitled to take in the same manner as a marital child by
intestate succession from ... his or her father if the father has either been adjudicated
to be the father in a paternity proceeding.., or has admitted in open court that he is
the father, or has acknowledged himself to be the father in writing signed by him.
Id.
222. LeRay, supra note 221, at 748.
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netic material through medical record keeping from storage to im-
plantation. Establishing a chain of custody from storage to birth
should also meet the clear and convincing standard of proof.
In some states, however, establishing paternity posthumously is not
permitted because the relevant statutes require paternal acknowledg-
ment or a court order during the potential father's life.22 3 For exam-
ple, in 1978 the United States Supreme Court upheld New York's rule
that an illegitimate child can only inherit from his or her father if a
court order declaring paternity had been issued during the father's
life.224 However, the court rulings that have considered these statutes
did not involve children who could only have been born after their
father's death. While the Supreme Court has upheld such restrictions
on proving paternity as fulfilling a legitimate public policy,225 a law
which effectively prohibits proving paternity may be
unconstitutional. 22 6
Yet another problem arises if extreme posthumous children are not
presumed to be children of the deceased husband of their mother. As
discussed above, if their mother has not remarried, then these children
are illegitimate, with no inheritance rights from their father, unless
they can prove paternity. However, if their mother has remarried,
then these children will be presumed to be the children of the second
marriage. Since children typically only have intestate succession
rights regarding the estate of their apparent biological parents, their
personal decision as to whether to prove paternity to their deceased
father will unavoidably involve materialistic considerations involving
the values of the estates of their "competing" fathers.
223. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-4 (1997); IOWA CODE § 633.222 (1996); N.Y. EST. POW-
ERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1-2 (McKinney 1997); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.15 (Anderson
1997).
224. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275 (1978).
225. Id. at 266.
226. Cf Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982). The Court, in Habluetzel, invalidated on
equal protection grounds a Texas statute that barred paternity actions by illegitimate children if
not brought before the child was one year old:
The equal protection analysis in this case . . . focuses on two related requirements.
First, the period for obtaining support must be sufficiently long in duration to present a
reasonable opportunity for those with an interest in such children to assert claims on
their behatf. Second, any limitation placed on that opportunity must be substantially
related to the State's interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims.
Applying these two requirements to the one-year right granted by Texas, we find a
denial of equal protection.
Id. at 99-100; see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (invalidating Pennsylvania's six-year
statute of limitations for establishing paternity in order to obtain child support payments as a
violation of equal protection because the statute did not provide a reasonable opportunity to
assert a claim on behalf of the illegitimate child); see also supra text accompanying notes 200-203
(discussing procreational rights).
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Note how involved this situation can be. If paternity of the de-
ceased is proven, then the child will not be considered the offspring of
her mother's current husband. After proving paternity, the child's
birth certificate (and possibly social security records) would be
changed. At this point, the probate proceedings could continue and
distribution of the biological father's estate would be completed. Fol-
lowing inheritance from her deceased father's estate, the child would
then have to be adopted by her mother's husband in order to return
her to her legal status quo ante.2 27
However, proving paternity of someone other than the mother's
current husband raises an additional complication: overcoming the
presumption that the parents to whom a child is born are the child's
biological parents. This presumption has been called "one of the
strongest presumptions in law" 22 8 and would almost certainly require
DNA or chain of custody evidence to overcome. Whereas obtaining
that evidence might be difficult, it would not be impossible. Yet this
evidentiary approach misses the point that the strength of the pre-
sumption of parenthood has been rendered outdated by technology.
Where once the presumption served a valuable function of providing
social and familial stability, technology has produced the possibility of
more than one set of legal parents-a situation the combination of
presumption of parenthood and intestate inheritance restrictions fails
to address adequately.
The aforementioned possibility of selecting one's parents based on
their material wealth is the least vexing of the problems created in this
area, though. The possibility of having more than one set of legal par-
ents requires a reconsideration of the typical, modern statutory ap-
proach which restricts children to intestate inheritance from only one
set of parents.22 9 Statutes which restrict intestate inheritance to one
set of parents by cutting off intestate inheritance rights to and from
the child's biological parent upon the child's adoption "away from"
the child's biological parent also must be reconsidered.2 30 The follow-
227. Fortunately, the infant would be oblivious to these proceedings, although her inheritance
would likely be eroded by the concomitant legal fees.
228. Leach v. Leach, 942 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Ark. 1997); R. McG. v. J.W., 615 P.2d 666, 675 &
n.5 (Colo. 1980); Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, 42 A.2d 106, 109 (Md. 1945); Serafin v. Serafin, 258
N.W.2d 461, 464 (Mich. 1977); Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 177 (Pa. 1997).
229. McGOVERN, supra note 209, at 47.
230. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.130 (Michie 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-215 (Michie
1997); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-731 (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 920 (1997); FLA. STAT. ch.
63.172 (1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-19 (1997); IDAHO CODE § 16-1509 (1997); IOWA CODE
§ 633.223 (1997); MAss. GEN. LAWS. ch. 210, § 7 (1997); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-11 (1997).
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ing section examines whether these and other issues can be satisfacto-
rily resolved through analogizing the situation to adoption.
2. Effects on Inheritance: An Analogy to Adoption?
A potential solution to some of the problems raised by technologies
is to analogize the bequeathing of cryogenically preserved reproduc-
tive materials to the act of giving up for adoption the children that are
eventually born from them, thereby cutting off intestate inheritance
rights running to the biological parent. While this analogy would
solve some of the inheritance problems, the analogy does not fit well
with the conceptual foundations of adoption statutes.
Statutes which restrict inheritance to only one set of parents can be
seen as based on the idea that the biological parent has "released" the
child to the adopting parent either by death or by affirmative act.
That release assures society that the statutory cut-off of intestate in-
heritance rights is fair. If the biological parent has already died, then
presumably the child has already inherited from their biological par-
ent. If the biological parent consents to the adoption, then the biolog-
ical parent is fully aware of the loss of intestate inheritance rights, but
need only include their biological child in their will to avoid the effects
of the law. Reproductive technologies prevent any analogy to this ar-
rangement presumed by statute.
First, if the analogy to adoption is applied and inheritance rights are
thereby cut off, an extreme posthumous child produced from frozen
reproductive material will not have had the opportunity to inherit
from his or her biological parent. Second, the act of placing genetic
materials in cryogenic storage cannot be seen as analogous to giving a
child up for adoption because there is no demonstration that the bio-
logical parent is aware that their eventual children will lose intestate
inheritance rights. The rationale supporting the restriction that chil-
dren can only inherit from one set of parents is lacking in this situa-
tion; logically, extreme posthumous children should be granted
intestate inheritance rights in both their biological parents' estates and
in the estate of their current parents.
The possibility of inheriting from two sets of parents raises an addi-
tional complication, though: if children who result from cryogenic
technology are allowed intestate inheritance from two sets of parents
because they are not adopted, there is little sense in limiting naturally
produced children who are adopted to intestate inheritance from only
one set of parents. While allowing extreme posthumous children to
inherit from two sets of parents does amount to special legal treat-
ment, a rational basis sufficient to withstand a constitutional challenge
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would not be difficult to establish. First, allowing adoption in the first
place is entirely a matter of state policy, and therefore, a state may
limit that state-created right as it sees fit. Second, since the process
resulting in more than two parents is not the product of a state statute,
allowing intestate inheritance from more than one set of parents is
simply a recognition of a biological and technological reality, rather
than state-sanctioned discrimination.
3. Proving Maternity
Cryotechnology also raises the novel problem of establishing mater-
nity. Recently, two situations demonstrating the potential for this
problem were reported. While not raising the legal issue of proving
maternity, the technological potential for such problems became a re-
ality when twenty-eight-year old Julie Garber died, leaving behind
twelve frozen embryos created from her eggs and sperm from an
anonymous donor.231 Evidently this was the first instance in the
United States of a woman providing for posthumous reproduction.232
Prior to the Garber situation, a doctor in Rome announced that two
years after a woman's death he thawed the woman's frozen embryo
and successfully implanted it in her sister's womb.233 While this issue
is not complicated by presumptions as the issue of paternity can be,234
the same problems of identifying the child's mother to establish inher-
itance rights now exist. This situation leads to its own unique compli-
cations. In Johnson v. Calvert,235 for example, the California Supreme
Court relied on intent to be the child's mother rather than genetics in
resolving competing claims to an infant between the biological mother
and the birth mother. However, in a situation involving proving ma-
ternity to a deceased woman in addition to the birth mother, intent to
be the child's mother would have to be seen as equal, leaving genetics
as the only possible determiner of maternity.
231. Ann Pepper, Victim of Leukemia Leaves Embryos, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Dec. 22,
1996, at A34, available in 1996 WL 11418908. Ms. Garber's parents declared their determination
to find a surrogate to bring at least one of the embryos to term. Id. at * 2. On December 7, 1997
the New York Times reported that one of Julie Garber's frozen zygotes had been successfully
implanted in a surrogate mother. Woman Who Died May Become a Mother, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
1997, § 1, at 33.
232. See supra note 231.
233. Vatican Denounces "Monstrous" Frozen Embryo Baby, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan.
11, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnews File; Doctor's Claims of How Baby Was
Born Doubted, PATRIOT LEDGER, Jan. 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnews
File.
234. While there is no presumption that a child born to a woman is her child, until recently
there has been no need for a presumption that presumed the only possible conclusion.
235. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
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A court need not feel compelled to resort to DNA testing in such
circumstances, though. In the absence of competing claims to mater-
nity, nothing prevents a court from ruling that a child has two
mothers. In fact, the two-mother precedent has already been estab-
lished in the context of lesbian couple adoptions.236 To date, no court
has limited inheritance rights to only one mother in such families. The
question for courts facing the possibility of two mothers has become
an evidentiary one, rather than one involving a principle of law. Tra-
ditionally, birth established maternity not as a matter of law but by
virtue of eye-witness evidence. Recently, DNA testing has emerged
as the most reliable method of establishing parentage. As a result,
technological advances present a modern court with a conflict of evi-
dence: (1) the traditionally accepted proof of maternity, eye-witnesses
to the birth, and (2) DNA evidence establishing biological ancestry.
In effect, technology has allowed the severing of two previously insep-
arable evidentiary conclusions. Existing legal principles do not ex-
clude either mother in this circumstance, and therefore, when facing
the issue of inheritance from birth and biological mothers, a court is
compelled to rule that a child may inherit from both mothers.
4. The Possibility of Four Parents237
It is also possible for both biological parents to die, bequeathing the
frozen zygote, preembryo or embryo for birth to parents without a
236. See generally Maxwell S. Peltz, Second-Parent Adoption: Overcoming Barriers to Lesbian
Family Rights, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 175 (1995) (discussing the legal barriers faced by lesbian
couples seeking to have families).
[11n recent years courts in roughly a dozen states and the District of Columbia have
granted second-parent adoptions to lesbian and gay couples, overcoming statutory bar-
riers by liberally interpreting provisions of adoption statutes in the best interests of the
child. Yet these decisions have done more than simply create an additional avenue for
adoption. Courts' recognition of second-parent adoption has conferred upon lesbian-
headed family units a degree of legal status denied by legislatures and opposed by a
majority of society. This anomalous right emerges because the virtually unprotected
family law rights of lesbians happen to converge with the highly protected interests of
children. The result is that the former can ride the latter into legally recognized status.
Id. at 177 (citations omitted).
237. Of course, modem technology makes it possible to have more than four "parents": (1)
the genetic father, (2) the genetic mother, (3) a surrogate mother who gives birth to the zygote
composed of the donated material, (4) the mother and (5) the father to whom the surrogate
surrenders the child, and (6) an adopting mother and (7) adopting father should the child later
be put up for adoption. Two other events increase the possibility of additional parents. First, it
is also possible for the zygote to be placed into a surrogate for development into a preembryo or
embryo, then removed for cryopreservation and later implanted into another surrogate. This
would increase the number of potential "parents" to eight. Second, subsequent adoptions could
of course increase the numbered parents, but such acts add nothing to the equation because they
merely repeat a process already described. These possibilities are not discussed in the text
because they do not increase the number of parents from whom one may inherit.
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genetic relationship to the child. While this situation does not in-
crease the number of new legal issues regarding inheritance claims
and establishing parenthood, it complicates those issues already dis-
cussed. For example, this situation raises the question of whether
parenthood should be established to both biological parents or would
it be more "lucrative" to choose between combinations of biological
and birth parents based on their various estate plans. As discussed in
the previous section, existing legal principles ought to compel a court
to recognize inheritance rights of the offspring which run to both bio-
logical parents and both birth parents.
B. The Wrath of the Rule Against Perpetuities
In any discussion of posthumous children, the effects of the Rule
Against Perpetuities must be considered. The Rule invalidates any
bequest of an interest that could possibly vest beyond a life in being
plus twenty-one years.2 38 Obviously this is not a problem in the tradi-
tional situation since the biological mother is the life in being with
regard to bequests to her children made by her or her late husband
and her children will certainly be born within twenty-one years of her
death. Just as obviously, though, this is not necessarily the case when
current reproductive technology is considered.
In fact, the combination of advances in reproductive technology and
the Rule Against Perpetuities produces some startling results. For ex-
ample, the routine bequest "to all my children" has never violated the
rule. However, the possibility of freezing sperm followed by artificial
insemination after the father's death means that this simple bequest is
invalid since it creates the classic possibility of the unborn widow.239
Similarly, artificial insemination means that bequests such as "to the
children of my good friend Frank Jones" violate the Rule, since
Frank's cryogenically preserved sperm could be used to impregnate
his unborn widow over twenty-one years after his death.240 In fact,
since the technology for impregnation after thawing frozen sperm was
evidently available as early as 1953,241 every bequest "to all my chil-
238. McGOVERN, supra note 209, at 504.
239. Caroline Sappideen, Life After Death-Sperm Banks, Wills and Perpetuities, 53 AUSTRA-
LIAN L.J. 311, 314 (1979). After making the bequest, the testator has some sperm frozen. Later,
the testator marries a woman who was not born when he wrote his will. He dies. His wife (the
unborn widow) waits 22 years before being artificially inseminated with his frozen sperm.
240. Id.
241. Kluger, supra note 4, at 106; see also W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in the Atomic Age:
The Sperm Bank and the Fertile Decedent, 48 ABA J. 942-44 (1962) (discussing sperm banks and
the rule against perpetuities).
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dren" since 1953 made in a state with the traditional perpetuities rule
was, is, and will be invalid!2 42
A considerable measure of relief from this disquieting result is
gained as a result of perpetuities reform and savings clauses.2 43 How-
ever, these solutions to the harshness of the effects of the Rule
Against Perpetuities lead to their own set of complications. If the tes-
tator's bequests to his children who could be born after a life in being
plus twenty-one years are valid, then the effects of those bequests
must be considered.
C. Testate Inheritance Rights of Extreme Posthumous Children
1. Specifically Stated Bequests
A bequest "to my children, including whatever children are born
from my [sperm or eggs] stored at Cryo-Keep" should be treated no
differently than a bequest "to my grandchildren, including any born
after my death." While there is no legal reason unique to heirs who
develop from cryogenically preserved genetic material that should
void such bequests, there are considerable practical problems a pro-
bate court must face in giving effect to specific bequests to extreme
posthumous children.
The most obvious practical problem is determining how to dis-
tribute the estate if the testator calls for distribution to living and
afterborn children in equal shares. Even if the testator provides spe-
cific amounts to then living children, the practical problem of how to
distribute the undivided portion of the estate would remain. The po-
tential number of posthumous children in such circumstances is not
difficult to calculate, however. Certainly, in the case of frozen eggs,
zygotes or embryos, the number is readily ascertained.244 In the case
of sperm, medical testimony could establish the number of times the
gametic material could be portioned out to attempt artificial
insemination.
One issue involving inheritance rights in the pre-birth context is rel-
evant here: the rights of the recipient of the frozen item. Since the
242. In fact, unless interpreted to refer only to children living at the time the will was written,
an atypical interpretation of such references, the reference "to my children" also violates the
Rule.
243. One of Professor Leach's proposed solutions to this problem was to extend the measur-
ing life to "the period of... [the testator's] reproductive capacity, including any post-mortem
period in which his sperm remains fertile." Leach, supra note 241, at 944. To date, no state has
adopted this approach.
244. At least it is for the time being. Cleaving preembryos is one of the stages of cloning
technology. There is no theoretical limit to the number of times that cells can be harvested from
a preembryo in order to produce identical offspring.
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item was bequeathed to that individual for use in producing a child,245
the bequest would either be considered conditional (i.e., "to Mary as
long as she uses it to produce our child") or precatory (i.e., "to Mary,
in the hope that she will use it to produce our child"). Without spe-
cific direction in the will, determining the testator's intention would be
impossible. Presumably, if the bequest is interpreted as a conditional
bequest to have a child and the bequest is disclaimed, then the condi-
tion could be imposed on any subsequent, contingent heir. Further, if
a monetarily valuable bequest were conditioned on the heir attempt-
ing to have a child by use of the reproductive material, then a court
should imply that the transfer of the reproductive material be made in
a manner consistent with producing pregnancy. Traditionally, courts
have been unwilling to add conditions other than those imposed by
the wording of the will246; however, the very nature of bequests of
reproductive material calls for shedding that traditional reluctance
under these circumstances. 247
2. Pretermission
The standard pretermission situation occurs when a testator dies
before revising his will to include a child born after his will was last
updated. Rather than exclude those afterborn children omitted from
the decedent's will, all but one state248 provides some share of the
estate for the omitted child as long as the omission was not inten-
tional.2 49 An extreme posthumous child complicates the pretermis-
sion analysis in several ways.
First, pretermission statutes are premised on the assumed intent of
the testator to include an afterborn child in the testator's will unless
evidence of intent to exclude the child exists. 250 For example, the Uni-
245. Even without an explicit testamentary statement to that effect, it must be presumed that
a testator would not bequeath frozen zygotes as mantelpiece curios.
246. See, e.g., Knupp v. District of Columbia, 578 A.2d 702, 705-06 (Ct. App. D.C. 1990); In re
Estate of Kerr, 433 F.2d 479, 489-90 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
247. Potential problems such as the court refusing to imply conditions necessary to ensure that
the reproductive material will be used to attempt conception emphasize the importance of advis-
ing a client regarding carefully worded bequests in these situations.
248. Wyoming is evidently the only state that does not have a pretermitted heir statute. Mc-
GOVERN, supra note 209, at 106 & n.1.
249. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-302 (1993).
250. There are two major distinctions in the types of pretermission statutes. The first distinc-
tion is whether evidence of intent to exclude which is not contained in the will may be intro-
duced. McGOVERN, supra note 209, at 108. The second distinction is whether the statute covers
only children born or adopted after the will or also includes children living at the time the will
was executed. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE section 2-302, for example, covers only children born
or adopted after execution of the will and prohibits extrinsic evidence regarding intent of the
testator. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-302.
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form Probate Code ("UPC")251 provides a share to the pretermitted
child unless "it appears from the will that the omission was inten-
tional. '252 Though technically all afterborn children, including pos-
thumous children, are covered by the pretermission statutes,253 the
purpose of a pretermission statute is to presume the deceased's intent
regarding his living children by presupposing that these children were
overlooked rather than intentionally excluded. This statutory presup-
position of the deceased's intent regarding living children is quite rea-
sonable. In fact, the presupposition is also reasonable with regard to
the typical posthumous child-even though presuming that the de-
ceased probably would have intended to provide for a child had the
deceased known that the child might be born is somewhat strained.
However, the logic underlying that presumption in the case of a child
born several years after the testator's death is far less compelling.
The simple fact that the testator took the unusual step of cryogeni-
cally preserving his or her reproductive material could be seen as an
indication of the intention by the testator that the eventual posthu-
mous child receive a share from the estate. If so, then it seems un-
likely that a court would conclude that the testator desired to
disinherit a product of the cryogenically preserved material. How-
ever, as the recent destruction in England of thousands of forgotten
zygotes demonstrates, 254 many people forget that the reproductive
material is in storage. If a testator specifically devises reproductive
material but does not include a testamentary provision for potential
offspring from that material, a court could reasonably reach two con-
trary conclusions: either that the testator deliberately excluded such
children, or that the testator's mention of them in the will implied a
desire to treat them as any other children. The inherent ambiguity in
such actions strains theoretical foundations of pretermission statutes
designed for less complex situations. Nonetheless, unless the testator
specifically excludes children resulting from cryogenically preserved
reproductive material, straightforward application of statutes which
protect all afterborn children should result in the award of a share to
the extreme posthumous child. In fact, given the demonstrated reluc-
tance of courts to exclude children who were alive when the will was
written even in the face of allowable extrinsic evidence, 255 the exclu-
251. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-302 (a)(1).
252. Id.
253. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE section 2-302 simply refers to a testator's failure to include any
of the testator's children born after the execution of the will. Id.
254. Bonnie Erbe & Betsy Hart, What Should Become of Un-needed Embryos?, DAYTON
NEWS DAILY, Aug. 9,1996, at A15, available in LEXIS, News Library, Daydnew File.
255. McGOVERN, supra note 209, at 108.
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sion of children born after the testator executed the will would almost
certainly have to be explicit and unequivocal.
The possibility of a testator forgetting about a potential posthumous
child, as opposed to forgetting to amend his will, points out yet an-
other important aspect of the pretermission laws. Pretermission laws
are predicated on the notion that the testator was aware of the omit-
ted child but forgot to amend his will.2 56 Long-term cryogenic storage
can essentially reverse this formula: the testator is aware of the provi-
sions in his will but forgets that additional children may eventually be
born. It is one thing for a statute to supply the presumption that a
parent intended to provide for all of his or her living children, but it is
quite another thing for the statute to presume that same intention to-
ward potential children, the possibility of whom the testator has com-
pletely forgotten about.257
The inherent differences between gametes and zygotes also raises
the possibility of a distinction between them regarding pretermission.
Zygotes, preembryos and embryos have the potential to develop into
a human being upon implantation into a womb. A gamete has no
such inherent potential. In attempting to intuit the intention of the
testator in a pretermission situation, courts may be tempted to allow
pretermission laws to cover children who result from frozen zygotes,
but not those who result from frozen gametes, by reasoning that a
testator is much more likely to be aware of potential offspring from
frozen zygotes, preembryos or embryos than from frozen gametes.2 58
Courts may also be swayed by the sheer weight of numbers involved.
Frozen semen contains millions of gametes. The process of obtaining
a zygote, however, greatly reduces the likely number that would be
frozen and probably reduces that number to less than twenty.259 Nur-
turing zygotes to the preembryo stage places an even greater practical
limitation on the number eventually placed in storage. Further, since
the process of obtaining and preserving reproductive material requires
more active involvement by the parents the further along the develop-
256. Id. at 106.
257. An analogy to the inheritance rights of pretermitted illegitimate children does not fit this
situation. Although the rights of illegitimate children are identical to the rights of children born
within the marriage, see, for example, In re Estate of Inger Heyn, 266 F.2d 206, 207 (3d Cir.
1959), inheritance by illegitimate children often has certain prerequisites such as written ac-
knowledgment. Such requirements have been held constitutional. See, e.g., In re Estate of Erbe,
457 N.W.2d 867 (S.D. 1990).
258. This distinction would not be subject to equal protection attack because it would be
based on a factual inquiry into the intention of the testator.
259. For example, seven frozen preembryos were at issue in the Davis case, five frozen preem-
bryos were at issue in the Kass case and only one in the York case. See also Appendix (describ-
ing the preservation process in detail).
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mental stages at which cryostorage occurs, it is logical to assume that a
testator was more likely to be aware of potential offspring the later in
development freezing occurs.
Unfortunately for any court which finds itself faced with a preter-
mission case involving offspring made possible by cryogenic technol-
ogy, the court will not be considering how to treat millions of gametes
or even a set of embryos; the court may very well be considering how
to treat a living individual. Denying that individual a share of inheri-
tance on the rationale that he or she developed from likely forgotten
frozen sperm rather than a likely remembered frozen zygote is dubi-
ous. If no clear indication of the testator's contrary intent can be
found, the safest course for a court would be to apply the statutory
assumption that the testator intended for all afterborn children to be
included in the testator's will.
D. Intestacy
In addressing intestate inheritance rights only two situations need
be considered: pre-birth entities (gametes, zygotes, preembryos, and
embryos) and the posthumous child.2 60 Neither gametes nor zygotes
have any rights until their birth. As one commentator has observed,
potentialities do not equal actualities: "Potential spouses do not have
equal rights or powers or privileges with actual ones; nor do potential
adults, potential presidents, potential graduates, potential citizens, or
potential persons. ''2 61 The closest one can come to recognizing any
rights in a pre-birth stage of development is the description provided
by the New York Supreme Court: "In point of fact, although an un-
born child has certain rights under property law, his enjoyment of
those rights is contingent upon his being born alive. '2 62 As the follow-
ing sections demonstrate, though, interpretation and application of
those statutes which provide those rights to unborn children is far
from simple.
260. Consideration of the rights of living blood relatives to avoid their legal relationship to the
posthumous child is an interesting, but tangential, issue. The courts in the Davis and Kass cases
reached different conclusions in considering the right of potential future parents to avoid the
status and obligations of parenthood. See supra notes 113-165 and accompanying text. Given
that the courts in those cases considered the resolution of that issue to be a close decision, it is
unlikely that a similar objection to a legal relationship from potential blood relatives would be
honored.
261. Rem B. Edwards, Abortion Rights: Why Conservatives Are Wrong, NAT'L FORUM, Sept.
22, 1989, at 19.
262. Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901, 904 (N.Y. 1969).
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1. The Statutory Problem of Afterborn Heirs
The question of intestate inheritance by a posthumous child is one
of statute rather than common law because every state except Louisi-
ana has codified and modified the common law intestate succession
scheme. 263 In all states in which the surviving spouse does not receive
the entire estate of the decedent, the remaining property is divided
among the children of the deceased. 264 The statutory wording of who
qualify as children of the deceased therefore becomes crucial in deter-
mining whether extreme posthumous children may inherit.265
The Uniform Probate Code illustrates the problems that extreme
posthumous children pose in any attempt to determine their status
under a given state's probate law. The UPC states that following the
surviving spouse, property of the estate passes to "the decedent's de-
scendants" 266 who survive the decedent by 120 hours.267 The UPC
does not define the term "descendants," presumably because the
meaning is obvious. The official comment to section 2-103 merely
states that "descendants" was selected over the term "issue" so that to
avoid the biological connotation of "issue" so that adopted children
would not be excluded from coverage. 268 Obviously, this explanation
does not provide any guidance with regard to posthumous children
except by negative implication: since they are not excluded from the
definition of "descendants," they must be included in it. This is con-
sistent with a legal tradition that until very recently could not have
anticipated heirs born years after a decedent's death. Thus, any bio-
263. Louisiana has never codified common law because its succession law has always been
contained in the Napoleonic Code under which the Louisiana Territory operated at the time of
its incorporation into the United States. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 870-1466 (West 1997).
264. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSEN, supra note 192, at 80-81.
265. Over a decade ago, the Los Angeles Superior Court was forced to address the question
of how to apply succession law when both husband and wife die leaving behind frozen embryos.
In 1983 Elsa and Mario Rios died leaving behind two frozen embryos. See Sandra Blakeslee,
New Issue in Embryo Case Raised Over Use of Donor, N.Y. TiMES, June 21, 1984, at A16, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File. The Rioses died intestate and did not leave instructions
regarding the disposition of the embryos. Id. Mr. Rios was also survived by a son from a previ-
ous marriage. Id. Before the question of Mr. Rios' estate could be answered it was discovered
that the embryos were not fertilized by Mr. Rios' sperm. Id. This discovery evidently precluded
consideration of whether the frozen embryos could inherit from Mr. Rios' estate if thawed, im-
planted, and brought to term. Id. However, the issue of whether eventual children could inherit
from Mrs. Rios remained and was decided in the negative by the Los Angeles Superior Court in
1985. See Thomas H. Maugh I1, Legacy of a Dead L.A. Couple; OK Granted to Implant 2 Dis-
puted Frozen Embryos, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1987, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Lat
File.
266. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103 (1991).
267. Id. § 2-104.
268. Id. § 2-103 commentary.
1998] REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY & INHERITANCE 797
logical descendant of the deceased, regardless of when or how they
came to be born, would be a "descendant" under section 2-103.
If the UPC said nothing more, a rule could be easily discerned and
applied. However, the UPC attempts to address the issue of afterborn
heirs specifically as follows: "An individual in gestation at a particular
time is treated as living if the individual lives 120 hours or more after
birth. '269 Unfortunately this provision, which has no accompanying
explanatory comment and has been adopted by nine states,270 does
not explain what "afterborn heirs" are being distinguished from. It is
not clear whether section 2-108 is simply re-phrasing the traditional
presumption of paternity2 71 or is distinguishing afterborn heirs "in ge-
station" from afterborn heirs who result from cryogenic storage.272
The previous version of section 2-108 stated that individuals who were
conceived before the decedent's death, but born after it, inherit as
though they had been born while the decedent was alive.2 73 Even
when one assumes that the provision was changed for a particular pur-
pose, whether the change narrows the class of potential heirs by ex-
cluding those conceived before the decedent's death but placed in
cryopreservation before the decedent's death, is not clear. Regardless
of the reason for the change, inheritance based on conception occur-
ring prior to the decedent's death is the law in nineteen states.2 74
Adding to the muddle is the fact that section 2-108 does not define
"in gestation." Once upon a time, gestation could only refer to post-
269. Id. § 2-108.
270. ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.108 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-2108 (1996); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 560:2-108 (1996); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-108 (1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-118 (1995);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-108 (Michie 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-08 (1997); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS § 29A-2-108 (Michie 1997); W. VA. CODE § 42-1-3f (1996).
271. The previous version of section 2-108 read: "Relatives of the decedent conceived before
his death but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the decedent."
UN1F. PROBATE CODE § 2-108 (1983). The reason for the change in wording is not clear but one
must assume that either a change in meaning or a clarification was intended. Unfortunately,
neither a new meaning nor a clarification is apparent.
272. It is possible that section 2-108 is an attempt to do both (i.e., distinguish traditional
afterborn heirs from cryogenically preserved heirs and state the traditional presumption of pa-
ternity for in utero heirs); however, one would expect that an attempt to amalgamate two sepa-
rate concepts would be either more explicitly worded or accompanied by an explanatory
comment.
273. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108 (1991).
274. ALA. CODE § 43-8-47 (1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-210 (Michie 1995); CAL. PROB.
CODE § 6407 (West 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-108 (1996); FLA. STAT. ch. 732.106 (1996);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-107; IDAHO CODE § 15-2-108 (1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 108
(West 1996); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107 (1996); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 27.5109
(1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2308 (1996); N.J. STAT. Ann. § 3B:5-8 (1996); N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.075 (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-
2-108 (Law. Co-op. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-108 (1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-108
(1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-8.1 (Michie 1997); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-103 (Michie 1997).
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conception, in utero development.275 However, this meaning is
clouded by the now routine sequence of conception, traditional gesta-
tion, cryogenic storage,2 76 traditional gestation, and birth. Moreover,
none of the nine states which have enacted section 2-108 as part of
their probate law have defined "gestation. '277
Further complicating the analysis of section 2-108 is the unstated
premise that a descendant must be alive to inherit. Just as the mean-
ing of "descendant" was apparently too obvious to merit stating, the
requirement that one be alive to inherit is not explicitly stated in the
UPC, but is implicit in section 2-108 which states that individuals in
gestation are treated as living while in gestation if they subsequently
survive birth by 120 hours. 278 As a result, if section 2-108 is inter-
preted so that "in gestation" does not include zygotes, preembryos
and embryos in cryogenic storage, then one must conclude that at the
moment of fertilization the zygote is "in gestation" and alive for pur-
poses of section 2-108, ceases to be alive upon freezing, then becomes
alive again when thawed. Such an application of section 2-108 and the
state laws modeled on it would lead to serious theoretical problems.
First, no compelling case has been made for conditioning biologi-
cally-based inheritance rights on the timing of the cryopreservation
procedure. That the law would mandate inquiry into both the time of
a deceased's fatal accident and the moment of cryopreservation to de-
termine whether the eventual child was "alive" at the time of the de-
cedent's death is absurd. This situation is not analogous to inquiries
into simultaneous deaths for three reasons. First, simultaneous death
inquiries focus on the timing of the end of life rather than the end of
one life and the beginning of another. This leads directly to the sec-
275. According to the American Heritage Dictionary, gestation is "the period of carrying de-
veloping offspring in the uterus after conception." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 556 (2nd
College ed. 1985). The ramifications of the different possible definitions of "in gestation" are
discussed, infra, in notes 254-73 and accompanying text.
276. Using the term "cryogenic interruption" would beg the question just as would using the
term "cryogenic gestation.
277. ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.108 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-2108 (1996); HAw. REV.
STAT. § 560:2-108; MINN. STAT. § 524.2-108 (1996); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-118 (1995); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 45-2-108 (Michie 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-08 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws § 29A-2-108 (Michie 1997); W. VA. CODE § 42-1-3f (1996).
278. In some states the statute addressing afterborn heirs is more explicit than the UPC. For
example, OREGON REVISED STATUTE section 112.075 states: "The relationships existing at the
time of the death of the decedent govern the passing of the net intestate estate, but persons
conceived before the death of the decedent and born alive thereafter inherit as though they were
alive at the time of the death of the decedent." OR. REV. STAT. § 112.075. The implication that
only the living may inherit is more obvious here than in the UPC. Also, the reference to concep-
tion, rather than "gestation," unambiguously covers cryopreserved zygotes, preembryos, and
embryos as long as conception occurred prior to the decedent's death.
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ond distinction: in the context of intestacy, simultaneous death inquir-
ies inevitably result in a grant of inheritance rights to the heirs of the
party deemed to have predeceased the testator; a similar inquiry into
coincidental death and cryopreservation would result in a denial of
inheritance rights to one's offspring. Finally, an inquiry into the tim-
ing of death and cryopreservation would actually be premised on the
unsupported assumption that the deceased would want to deny inheri-
tance rights to their offspring born following cryopreservation.
The second reason for not conditioning inheritance rights on the
timing of the cryopreservation process is that avoiding the loss of in-
heritance rights by bad timing is precisely why afterborn heirs have
been allowed to inherit since at least the time of the Roman Em-
pire.279 To illustrate how easily the "bad timing" situation can arise,
consider this uncomplicated scenario: father and mother arrive at the
fertility clinic at separate times to deposit sperm and eggs; they depart
at separate times as well; upon the second deposit fertilization occurs
and the clinic prepares for cryopreservation; the second parent to
leave is involved in a fatal accident after leaving the facility. A pro-
bate court applying a version of section 2-108 interpreted as excluding
cryopreserved zygotes would be forced to inquire as to precisely when
the parent died as compared to precisely when the zygote was actually
frozen.2 0
Third, if the zygote is to be considered alive ("in gestation") prior to
freezing, "not alive" while frozen, then alive upon thawing, peculiar
legal problems develop. For instance, if the frozen zygote is not con-
sidered alive, then prior to freezing the zygote, it would possess incho-
ate inheritance rights which it would lose upon freezing (because it
was no longer legally alive), even though it was subsequently born. If
that is the case, this would be the first time a medical procedure re-
279. Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519,
1559 (1990). "Since the days of the Roman Empire, a fetus in existence at the time of the
testator's death and subsequently born alive has been entitled to inherit property equally with its
living siblings." Id.
280. Admittedly, this kind of second-by-second inquiry occurs in simultaneous death situa-
tions, but that has some theoretical legitimacy-who was alive at the time of the decedent's
death? In the case of cryopreservation this type of inquiry would pile logical legal theory on top
of logical legal theory to reach an illogical result. We start from the premise that only people
alive can inherit. Then we expand this to include children conceived before the decedent's death
because, while not truly alive in the traditional sense, we feel that to ignore the reality of their
inchoate existence and deny them inheritance rights due to an accident of timing would not only
be unjust but would ignore the fact of parentage. However, to deny a child inheritance rights
based on when they were placed in cryopreservation is to do exactly what the exception sought
to avoid: denying inheritance rights due to an accident of timing that negates the reality of an
ongoing biological relationship with the deceased.
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suited in the loss of legal rights. 281 The alternative is to treat the fro-
zen zygote as "not alive," or "not in gestation," and allow it to retain
the inchoate rights it gained prior to freezing. If that approach is
taken, then there seems no logic in allowing one frozen zygote to re-
tain inheritance rights because it was frozen after the deceased died
while denying those rights to a zygote frozen before the deceased died.
Since couples usually deposit sufficient gametes to create several zy-
gotes, the duration and sequence of the fertilization and cryopreserva-
tion procedure could result in some zygotes acquiring inheritance
rights, while other zygotes that were part of the same process being
denied those rights. Again, we return to the issue of the logic of pro-
viding inheritance rights based on the timing of a medical procedure
over which the parents ultimately have no control, rather than the un-
deniable biological connections on which the rights of afterborn heirs
have always been based.
If zygotes, preembryos, and embryos are allowed to retain inchoate
inheritance rights because they were in gestation at the time of the
decedent's death, subsequent freezing can delay birth indefinitely.
Thus, the basic problem posed by the use of cryotechnology remains:
applying the laws of inheritance when children of the deceased are
born years after the decedent's death.
2. The Statutory Problem of Paternity vs. Inheritance
At this point, the issue of presumption of paternity discussed ear-
lier,282 must be revisited. As previously explained, several states pro-
vide a presumption of paternity if a child is born within either ten
months or 300 days following the death of the decedent. 283 This pre-
sumption of paternity is distinct from granting afterborn children the
right to be treated as living at the time of the deceased's death. Un-
fortunately, when cryotechnology is involved, that distinction causes
problems in several jurisdictions.
281. The only medical procedure which alters, rather than eliminates, legal rights is a sex
change operation. Of course, when an individual undergoes a sex change they do lose the right
to enter the bathroom of their former sex, but this circumstance is readily distinguishable: a sex
change is surgical and results in fundamental physiological changes, cryopreservation is not sur-
gical and does not alter the zygote, preembryo, or embryo in any way. Moreover, a sex change
does not actually result in a loss of rights but rather a substitution of the same rights and restric-
tions imposed on both sexes.
282. See supra notes 209-32 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text. Several states require birth within ten
months or 300 days of the decedent's death, although one state requires birth within 280 days.
See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
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Since cryotechnology allows storage of reproductive material at var-
ious stages of development, it is possible for children to benefit from a
presumption of paternity but lack intestate inheritance rights. The po-
tential for violating the fundamental premise that children inherit
from their parents exists in twelve states: Alabama,2 84 Arizona,2 85 Col-
orado, 286 Hawaii, 287 Minnesota,288 Montana,289 New Jersey,2 90 New
Mexico,2 91 North Dakota,2 92 South Dakota,2 93 Tennessee 294 and Wyo-
ming.295 In Alabama, Colorado, New Jersey, Tennessee and Wyo-
ming, it is possible for a child to be conceived from the deceased's
frozen sperm after the decedent's death and born within the time al-
284. At. CODE §§ 26-17-5(2)(a), 43-8-47 (1996) (presuming paternity if the child is born
within 300 days of the death of the mother's husband, and requiring conception prior to death
for intestate inheritance).
285. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-814(A)(1), 14-2108 (West 1996) (presuming paternity if
the child is born within 10 months of the death of the mother's husband, and requiring the child
to be "in gestation" at time of decedent's death).
286. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-4-105, 15-11-108 (1996) (presuming paternity if the child is born
within 300 days of the death of the mother's husband, and requiring conception prior to death
for intestate inheritance).
287. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 584-4(2)(A), 560:2-107, 560:2-108 (1996) (presuming paternity if the
child is born within 300 days of the death of mother's husband, and requiring either conception
prior to the father's death or requiring the child to be "in gestation" at time of decedent's death
for intestate inheritance). The situation in Hawaii is confusing because evidently two versions of
that state's afterborn heir statute exist: one in which the heir must be "in gestation" at the dece-
dent's death, id. § 560:2-108, and another in which the heir must be conceived at the time of the
decedent's death, id. § 560:2-107.
288. MINN. STAT. §§ 257.55, 524.2-108 (1996) (presuming paternity if the child is born within
280 days of the death of the mother's husband, and requiring the child to be "in gestation" at
time of decedent's death for intestate inheritance).
289. MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-105, 72-2-118 (1995) (presuming paternity if the child is born
within 300 days of the death of the mother's husband, and requiring the child to be "in gesta-
tion" at time of decedent's death for intestate inheritance).
290. N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-43, 3B:5-8 (West 1996) (presuming paternity if the child is
born within 300 days of the death of the mother's husband and requiring conception prior to
death for intestate inheritance).
291. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-11-5, 45-2-108 (Michie 1997) (presuming paternity if the child is
born within 300 days of the death of mother's husband, and requiring the child to be "in gesta-
tion" at time of decedent's death for intestate inheritance).
292. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-17-04, 30.1-04-08 (Michie 1997) (paternity presumed if the child
is born within 300 days of the death of mother's husband, and requiring the child to be "in
gestation" at time of decedent's death for intestate inheritance).
293. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-8-57, 29A-2-108 (Michie 1997) (presuming paternity if the
child is born within 10 months of the death of mother's husband, and requiring the child to be
"in gestation" at time of decedent's death for intestate inheritance).
294. TENN. CODE §§ 36-1-102, 31-2-108 (1996) (presuming paternity if the child is born within
300 days of the death of mother's husband, and requiring conception prior to death for intestate
inheritance).
295. WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-102, 2-4-103 (Michie 1997) (paternity presumed if child born
within 300 days of the death of mother's husband, and requiring conception prior to death for
intestate inheritance).
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lotted for the presumption of paternity, yet not receive intestate inher-
itance rights because the child was not conceived before the decedent
died. In Arizona, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota
and South Dakota, if "in gestation" is interpreted to exclude cry-
opreserved zygotes, preembryos and embryos, then regardless of
whether conception occurs before or after the decedent's death, the
child will not have intestate inheritance rights despite enjoying the
presumption of paternity if born within the statutory period following
the death of the decedent. The conflict in both logic and theory
presented by denying children the right to inherit from their parents is
obvious.
Cryopreservation technology also makes it possible for a child to
gain intestate inheritance rights but not the presumption of paternity.
This potential exits in thirteen states296: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Da-
kota, South Dakota, Tennessee, West Virginia and Wyoming. In all of
these states, if cryopreservation of the zygote, preembryo or embryo
occurs after the death of the decedent, it is possible for an afterborn
child to be either conceived or "in gestation" (depending on the stat-
ute in question) at the time of the decedent's death, yet not born
within the allotted statutory period for the presumption of paternity.
In fact, depending on how "in gestation" is defined and when cry-
opreservation occurs, at least sixty combinations of these rights are
possible. The combinations result from the confluence of three fac-
tors. The first is whether a state provides a presumption of pater-
nity if the child is conceived prior to the decedent's death or the
state has a "born within 300 days of the death of the mother's hus-
band" type of statute. The second factor is the timing of cry-
opreservation and birth. The third factor is whether the statute that
grants intestate inheritance rights is based on either conception or
the commencement of gestation prior to the decedent's death.
Therefore, before considering a chart which illustrates the combina-
tions, it is necessary to explain the possible interpretations of "in
gestation."
As mentioned above,2 97 gestation has traditionally meant in utero
development. 298 Of course, this definition was developed in a time
296. See supra notes 288-95. The potential may actually exist in thirteen states if Hawaii is
included. As mentioned in note 287, the situation in Hawaii is confusing because evidently two
versions of that state's afterborn heir statute exist: one in which the heir must be "in gestation"
at the decedent's death, HAw. REV. STAT. § 560:2-108 (1996), and another in which the heir must
be conceived at the time of the decedent's death, id. § 560:2-107.
297. See supra notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
298. Incidentally, this definition is also found in BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY, but this source is
of no value in the analysis. BLACK'S definition of gestation is "the time during which a woman
carries a fetus in her womb, from conception to birth." BLACK'S LAW DIC]'IONARY 687 (6th ed.
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when this was the only possible method of gestation. Not all sources
are so restrictive in defining the term. For example, Webster's Third
International Dictionary defines gestation in pertinent part as: "the
carrying of young [usually] in the uterus from conception to delivery
... the incubation of eggs. '299 Two thins are of interest in this defini-
tion. The first is the qualification "usually in the uterus." The second
is the reference to "incubation"; the same source defines "incubate" in
pertinent part as "to maintain ... under prescribed and [usually] con-
trolled conditions ... favorable for hatching or development ... to
cause to develop" 300 What is clear from these various definitions is
that at least three interpretations of "in gestation" are possible: (1) "in
the process of developing," (2) "in utero development," and (3) "any
point after conception." The third interpretation is arguably a legiti-
mate possibility since cryopreservation can occur after conception;
however, this interpretation effectively equates to "conception" which
was the term replaced by "in gestation" in UPC Section 2-108.
The following tables illustrate the applications of reproductive tech-
nology and possible interpretations of "in gestation" in combination
with the presumptions of paternity and afterborn heirs' right to inheri-
tance. Prior to the use of cryopreservation technology in the area of
reproduction, only the last two situations noted in the tables were pos-
sible: conception prior to the father's death with the only possible va-
riation being duration of the resulting pregnancy. As the tables
demonstrate, reproductive technology now allows every possible com-
bination of inheritance rights and presumptions of paternity. What
was once both intuitive and easily predictable has now proliferated
into sixty combinations which include the illogical results of gaining a
presumption of paternity but no inheritance rights as well as obtaining
inheritance rights but no presumption of paternity.
1990). However, the definition is taken from Dazey v. Dazey, 122 P.2d 308 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1942), in which the court refers to an unidentified dictionary as its authority.
299. WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 952 (1971).
300. Id.
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TABLE 1(A)
SITUATION: ZYGOTE CREATED AFTER FATHER'S DEATH,
CHILD BORN AFTER 10 MONTH/300 DAY PERIOD
Inheritance Rights if Gestation Defined As:
Any point
Carrying the In the process of beyond
Type of Jurisdiction child development conception
Paternity presumed if No presumption No/No No/No
child conceived before of paternity/
father's death No inheritance
rights
Paternity presumed if No/No No/No No/No
child born within 10
month/300 day period
after father's death
TABLE 1(B)
SITUATION: ZYGOTE CREATED AFTER FATHER'S DEATH,
CHILD BORN WITHIN 10 MONTH/300 DAY PERIOD
Inheritance Rights if Gestation Defined As:
Any point
Carrying the In the process of beyond
Type of Jurisdiction child development conception
Paternity presumed if No/No No/No No/No
child conceived before
father's death
Paternity presumed if Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No
child born within 10
month/300 day period
after father's death
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TABLE 2(A)
SITUATION: ZYGOTE FROZEN PRIOR TO FATHER'S DEATH,
CHILD BORN AFTER 10 MONTH/300 DAY PERIOD
Inheritance Rights if Gestation Defined As:
Any point
Carrying the In the process of beyond
Type of Jurisdiction child development conception
Paternity presumed if Yes/No Yes/No Yes/Yes
child conceived before
father's death
Paternity presumed if No/No No/No No/Yes
child born within 10
month/300 day period
after father's death
TABLE 2(B)
SITUATION: ZYGOTE FROZEN PRIOR TO FATHER'S DEATH,
CHILD BORN WITHIN 10 MONTH/300 DAY PERIOD
Inheritance Rights if Gestation Defined As:
Any point
Carrying the In the process of beyond
Type of Jurisdiction child development conception
Paternity presumed if Yes/No Yes/No Yes/Yes
child conceived before
father's death
Paternity presumed if Yes/No Yes/No Yes/Yes
child born within 10
month/300 day period
after father's death
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TABLE 3(A)
SITUATION: ZYGOTE IN VITRO AT FATHER'S DEATH,
ZYGOTE THEN FROZEN AFTER FATHER'S DEATH,
CHILD BORN AFTER 10 MONTH/300
DAY PERIOD
Inheritance Rights if Gestation Defined As:
Any point
Carrying the In the process of beyond
Type of Jurisdiction child development conception
Paternity presumed if Yes/No Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
child conceived before
father's death
Paternity presumed if No/No No/Yes No/Yes
child born within 10
month/300 day period
after father's death
TABLE 3(B)
SITUATION: ZYGOTE IN VITRO AT FATHER'S DEATH,
ZYGOTE THEN FROZEN AFTER FATHER'S DEATH,
CHILD BORN WITHIN 10 MONTH/300
DAY PERIOD
Inheritance Rights if Gestation Defined As:
Any point
Carrying the In the process of beyond
Tpe of Jurisdiction child development conception
Paternity presumed if Yes/No Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
child conceived before
father's death
Paternity presumed if Yes/No Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
child born within 10
month/300 day period
after father's death
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TABLE 4(A)
SITUATION: ZYGOTE CREATED PRIOR TO FATHER'S DEATH
AND ZYGOTE FROZEN PRIOR TO FATHER'S
DEATH, CHILD BORN AFTER 10 MONTH!
300 DAY PERIOD
Definition of Gestation:
Any point
Carrying the In the process of beyond
'Tpe of Jurisdiction child development conception
Paternity presumed if Yes/No Yes/No Yes/Yes
child conceived before
father's death
Paternity presumed if No/No No/No No/No
child born within 10
month/300 day period
after father's death
TABLE 4(B)
SITUATION: ZYGOTE CREATED PRIOR TO FATHER'S DEATH
AND ZYGOTE FROZEN PRIOR TO FATHER'S
DEATH, CHILD BORN WITHIN 10
MONTH/300 DAY PERIOD
Definition of Gestation:
Any point
Carrying the In the process of beyond
Type of Jurisdiction child development conception
Paternity presumed if Yes/No Yes/No Yes/Yes
child conceived before
father's death
Paternity presumed if Yes/No Yes/No Yes/Yes
child born within 10
month/300 day period
after father's death
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TABLE 5(A)
SITUATION: ZYGOTE IN UTERO AT FATHER'S DEATH AND
ZYGOTE FROZEN AFTER FATHER'S DEATH, CHILD
BORN AFTER 10 MONTH/300 DAY
PERIOD
Definition of Gestation:
Any point
Carrying the In the process of beyond
'Iype of Jurisdiction child development conception
Paternity presumed if Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
child conceived before
father's death
Paternity presumed if No/Yes No/Yes No/Yes
child born within 10
month/300 day period
after father's death
TABLE 5(B)
SITUATION: ZYGOTE IN UTERO AT FATHER'S DEATH AND
ZYGOTE FROZEN AFTER TO FATHER'S DEATH,
CHILD BORN WITHIN 10 MONTH/300
DAY PERIOD
Definition of Gestation:
Any point
Carrying the In the process of beyond
Type of Jurisdiction child development conception
Paternity presumed if Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
child conceived before
father's death
Paternity presumed if Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
child born within 10
month/300 day period
after father's death
3. Distribution Issues Involving Extreme Posthumous Children
In those states in which extreme posthumous children may be enti-
tled to intestate inheritance, two situations may arise. In the first situ-
ation, the potential extreme posthumous child is specifically provided
for in a will, but intestate property remains to be distributed. In the
second situation, the entire estate, including the reproductive material
that may eventually produce an extreme posthumous child, passes ac-
cording to intestacy laws.
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The only issue raised by the first situation is how the estate is to be
divided so that the interests of the potential extreme posthumous chil-
dren are protected. As discussed above,301 determining the number of
potential offspring is simply a matter of counting the number of frozen
eggs, zygotes, preembryos or embryos.30 2 In the case of frozen sperm,
even though millions of sperm may be stored, medical testimony could
establish the maximum number of portions into which the gametic
material could effectively be divided for artificial insemination at-
tempts. Once the number of potential offspring is established, the
number of living intestate heirs would be added to determine the total
number of potential heirs; the intestate estate would be divided into
that number of shares. The living heirs would be given their shares as
in a typical probate proceeding, while the remainder of the estate
would be held and distributed to extreme posthumous children as they
are born. 30 3 Should the number of potential extreme posthumous
children be reduced (e.g., through failed conception attempts, miscar-
riages or stillbirths304 ) a distribution of that share would be divided
among the living and potential posthumous heirs. 30 5
Resolving the second scenario in which the entire estate must pass
according to intestate law is more complicated. While the same
method of dividing the estate in order to provide for potential ex-
treme posthumous children would be used, the complicating factor is
that the reproductive material that may eventually produce extreme
301. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
302. The ability to cleave human cells from preembryos, thereby creating a theoretically un-
limited supply of identical offspring which could be born at different times, will likely be per-
fected in the near future.
303. Protection of the interests of potential afterborn heirs can be afforded in one of two
ways: either by placing their shares in escrow, or by filing a bond that would cover their shares in
the event of their birth. The latter is commonplace when a trust is terminated, but afterborn
beneficiaries are a possibility. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 340 cmt. (e) (1959).
304. The most recent article available documents a successful implantation rate of 7.7% when
implanting frozen and thawed embryos and a pregnancy rate of only 16% in those receiving
frozen and thawed embryos. David Levron et al., Pregnancy Potential of Human Oocyte: The
Effect of Cryopreservation, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1153, 1153 (1990). Obviously, successful birth
rates will be lower than those documented pregnancy rates.
305. For instance, assuming there is no surviving spouse, if three heirs are currently alive and
two zygotes are in cryostorage, the estate would be divided in ninths, with the living heirs each
receiving their one fifth presently. Then as additional heirs were born, they would receive their
one fifth distribution. If the number of zygotes is reduced, thereby reducing the number of
potential additional heirs, then heirs living at the time of that reduction would receive an addi-
tional distribution based on equal division of that share. Thus, in the example provided herein, if
a zygote is thawed but fails to develop after implantation, the one fifth share held in escrow (or
protected by a bond), for that had been held for potential heir would be divided by four (the
number of living heirs plus the remaining zygote in cryostorage), and distributed accordingly.
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posthumous children is itself property of the estate. 30 6 Thus, current
heirs would actually inherit the material that could eventually produce
an extreme posthumous heir.307 This raises two issues.
The first issue is division of the reproductive material among the
current heirs. Resolving this issue is not difficult. As is currently the
case with items in an estate which are not susceptible of division (e.g.,
a family heirloom), the heirs agree to a division of the estate. In this
context, the value of the reproductive material is a matter of negotia-
tion and its resolution is reduced to a settlement agreement. Deter-
mining the value of the material is not difficult in this context as it is
simply a matter of the private negotiating process; resort to third party
evaluation is not necessary. If the parties cannot agree and must re-
sort to judicial determination of the value of the material, the calcula-
tion would be simple: the value of the material if sold to a medical
facility.30 8 Arguments that the material has a "special" nature and
therefore is insusceptible of valuation 309 fail because these items are
routinely bought and sold. Moreover, any additional, "special" value
asserted by the heirs would fall into the category of sentimental or
emotional value and should be treated the same way that the emo-
tional value aspect of family heirlooms is considered in tort cases-as
having no additional compensable value at all.310 Complicating the
306. See supra text accompanying notes 73-78 (discussing classification of reproductive mate-
rial as property which is subject to ownership, bequeathing, and inheriting).
307. One colleague, Professor Douglas Beloof, has suggested that the probate court might
refuse to allow the deceased's offspring to inherit the deceased's reproductive material out of a
public policy concern that the court would be assisting the commission of incest should the de-
ceased's children use the material themselves. Interview with Douglas Beloof, visiting professor,
Northwestern School of Law, at Northwestern School of Law (Nov. 17, 1997). The idea is inter-
esting, but is addressed in two ways. First, the motivation of the current heir need not be so
singularly focused. The current heir may not wish to have a child themselves, but may wish for
another sibling to be born from a surrogate. Second, the court could order that transferral of the
deceased's reproductive material be made at the appropriate facility and in the appropriate fash-
ion (e.g., artificial insemination of someone who is not related to the deceased) so as to avoid
any possibility of incest. Id.
308. Recently an Oregon jury awarded a man $1,250,000 when the hospital storing his sperm
lost the sperm. Laura Trujillo, Hospital Will Pay $1.25 Million in Lost Sperm Case, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, Oct. 11, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 13127860. The man had made the sperm
deposits prior to chemotherapy treatments in case those treatments left him sterile. Id. 'The
plaintiff's argument was not based on the value of the sperm itself, though, but on the plaintiff's
loss of his ability to have a family. Id.
309. See, e.g., George R. Smith, III, Australia's Frozen "Orphan" Embryos: A Medical, Legal
and Ethical Dilemma, 24 J. FAM. L. 27, 31 (1985-86) (arguing that such material cannot be given
an economic value).
310. Typically claims for sentimental or emotional damages for loss of property are considered
too speculative to allow. See, e.g., Carpel v. Saget Studios, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1331, 1333 (E.D. Pa.
1971) ("The alleged lost sentimental value ... is so highly speculative that it is not a proper
element of damages for consideration by the jury. There are no guidelines available to aid the
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determination of value, though, would be the claim that whoever re-
ceives custody of the reproductive material would also be a potential
guardian or birth parent of the extreme posthumous heir and thereby
have some control over yet another portion of the deceased's estate.
However, that potential additional gain would be of inconsequential
value since it is both speculative and remote as it will not inure di-
rectly to the guardian's benefit if indeed it ever occurs.
The second issue raised involving intestate inheritance by extreme
posthumous heirs is that the extreme posthumous heirs would them-
selves be heirs of whatever reproductive material that remains in cry-
ostorage after their birth. Initially, this would seem to greatly
complicate calculation of distribution as the potential heirs would be
entitled to a re-division of the remaining material in cryostorage.
Such re-division should not be necessary, though, since the extreme
posthumous heirs would simply be entitled to a distribution of a set
amount of funds rather than the property that was once in the estate.
Their interests in this manner would have been protected by the ap-
pointment of a guardian ad litem during the probate proceedings and
their shares would come from either an escrow account or as a result
of bond posted precisely for this purpose.
311
III. THE DIFFICULTIES OF LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
As noted above,312 the long-standing unrestricted right to bequeath
property cannot be circumvented by a legislative declaration that
these items are not property because this would be a taking requiring
compensation. The creation by a legislature of a new legal status
which is neither property nor person faces several objections. First,
since current legal principles allow these items to be bequeathed, the
only reason for creating a new legal category would be to prohibit
such bequests. This is an extreme and unnecessary step because plac-
ing safeguards on either the bequest or the guardianship of these
items would be much more appropriate than creating an entirely new
category of legal existence which is neither property nor person. Sec-
ond, creating a special category that prohibits recognition of the de-
ceased's instructions regarding such items on the theory that they are
jury in determining a dollar value for this loss."); see also Herberg v. Swartz, 578 P.2d 17, 26
(Wash. 1978) (stating that it is impermissible to value property solely for its sentimental value);
Palin v. General Constr. Co., 287 P.2d 325, 328 (Wash. 1955) (stating that recovery of damages
cannot be had on the basis of purely sentimental value); Kimball v. Betts, 169 P. 849, 850 (Wash.
1918) (commenting that determination of value does not include sentimental or fanciful value).
311. See supra note 303.
312. See supra note 196.
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something more than property would actually afford greater protec-
tion for gametes, zygotes, preembryos and embryos than for minor
children whom the courts attempt to place into custodianships as di-
rected by the decedent's will.313 Third, the law already allows these
items to be donated and sold; it makes little sense to prohibit the
transfer at death of things that may be transferred during life. To be
consistent and effective, a ban on the posthumous transfer of these
items would have to be combined with a ban on all such transfers; in
effect, a legislature would have to take the unprecedented step of de-
claring these items to be both sui generis and res extra commercium.314
Further, constitutional issues arise if bequeathing reproductive ma-
terial is prohibited. First, prohibiting the bequest of these items
means that they must escheat to the state. Mandating that something
escheat to the state amounts to a taking for which due process re-
quires adequate compensation.315 Further, if the reproductive mate-
rial is to be bequeathed to the surviving spouse, then the procreative
rights of the surviving spouse also must be considered if a law pur-
ports to ban the bequest. As one commentator has observed,
"[r]espect for the procreative liberty of the surviving spouse should
permit posthumous thawing and implantation to occur. The survivor
has a real interest in procreating, which the frozen embryo serves well
.... [A] law that prohibited posthumous implantation would infringe
the survivor's procreative liberty, and is unnecessary. ' 316
While an outright prohibition of the right to bequeath these items
would be unprecedented, impractical and probably unconstitutional,
this does not mean that it is impossible to limit the right to bequeath
these items; therefore, the issues and problems relevant to this legisla-
tive option must be examined. Any effort at suggesting detailed legis-
lation in this area would require consideration of numerous
philosophical and political issues, and consideration of those areas is
beyond the scope of this inquiry. However, while it is not realistic to
speculate about the details of comprehensive legislation in this area, it
313. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-202 (1975) (amended 1993).
314. Roman law used the term res extra commercium to refer to things which were deemed
inalienable. Oliver Metzger, Note, Making the Doctrine of Res Extra Commercium Visible in
United States Law, 74 TEx. L. REV. 615, 615 (1996) (citing 2 CHARLES P. SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW
IN THE MODERN WORLD 139-41 (1917)). In the modern world, few things fit into this category,
and res extra commercium has never been formally applied in U.S. law. Id.
315. See supra note 196. Legislatively deeming these items to be something other than prop-
erty (and therefore not covered by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments) would not end the
inquiry but would force judicial examination of the nature of property. As discussed above, see
supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text, the proper analysis requires the conclusion that these
items are property.
316. ROBERTSON, supra note 50, at 111.
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is worthwhile to point out the larger difficulties which the drafters of
such legislation would face.
Assuming the political will existed to regulate the right to bequeath
and inherit these items, several issues of legal classification must be
addressed. First, the threshold issue is legislative recognition of the
biological differences among gametes, zygotes, preembryos and em-
bryos. Egg and sperm have no inherent potential to develop beyond
their condition as gametes. Once these gametes have joined with each
other to form a zygote, their biological nature changes radically. Zy-
gotes, preembryos and embryos by virtue of their varying potential to
develop into human beings are inherently distinct from gametes, and
this distinction might justify distinct legal treatment of them. Further,
since the potential for development varies significantly among the zy-
gote, preembryo, and embryo stages, it may be possible to justify dis-
tinct legal treatment of these three as well. Finally, since none of the
post-conception group has the ability to develop into a human being
unless implanted in a woman, that characteristic might justify treat-
ment which is different once the items are inside of a woman's
body.317 Any legislation which does not fully integrate consideration
of those biological distinctions risks foundering on the constitutional
requirement that legislation have, at the very least, a rational basis.318
IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion provides an analytical framework for ad-
dressing the issues raised by the effect of reproductive technology in
the field of inheritance law. As has been demonstrated, gametes, zy-
gotes, preembryos and embryos are inescapably property. They are
not persons nor are they properly classified as occupying a category
between persons and property. Moreover, since the correct analytical
framework demonstrates that "persons" are not outside of the cate-
gory of "property" but are undeniably within a sub-category of prop-
erty, any legislation that attempted to establish these items as non-
property would be both unprecedented and theoretically infirm. The
proper judicial approach therefore should be to acknowledge the na-
ture of gametes, zygotes, preembryos and embryos as property. Fur-
317. The abortion rights cases apparently have relevance here only after the item has been
implanted because they address rights in the context of a woman and her body. In the case of
items which have yet to be implanted, those concerns are non-existent.
318. Indeed the constitutional requirements may be significantly higher in certain instances:
"Embryo protection laws, however, even if they do not infringe bodily integrity, do interfere
with decisions about having biologic offspring and thus limit procreative choice." ROBERTSON,
supra note 50, at 108.
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ther, although it is possibly legitimate to classify these items as a sui
generis type of property, no adequate appropriate analogies exist to
guide the courts once this conclusion is reached.
As property, a probate court has jurisdiction over such items in
one's estate. Additionally, as property, such items may be bequeathed
unless a statute specifically prevents it. Currently, no laws prohibit
such bequests, and the consistent, historical trend of jurisprudence fa-
vors maximizing the freedom of the deceased in disposing of his
estate.
The existence of probate property which may itself eventually be-
come an heir to an estate does not pose insurmountable problems.
There appears to be no reason why the offspring produced from cry-
opreserved gametes, zygotes, preembryos or embryos should not be
permitted to inherit if provided for by the testator. Further, existing
methods of preserving property for unborn, contingent trust benefi-
ciaries can readily be used to preserve property for distribution to
heirs born long after the death of the testator.
Intestate succession, however, presents some problems that appar-
ently may only be solved through statutory reform. While intestate
succession generally is granted to afterborn heirs, judicial interpreta-
tion of particular statutory wording will determine whether an
afterborn heir may inherit even though the heir is conceived before
the deceased has died. The most sensible analysis based on biological
reality indicates that such afterborn heirs should be allowed to inherit.
Nevertheless, statutory reform is needed in several states to resolve
statutory inconsistencies which grant presumptions of paternity but
deny inheritance rights to afterborn heirs, or which deny the presump-
tion of paternity but grant inheritance rights.
As stated in the introduction to this Article, the source of the legal
conundrums discussed here is the inherent inability of law to maintain
pace with technologically-driven social change. Law is, by nature and
design, the social institution which changes most gradually. As a re-
sult, the law faces difficulties when confronted with technological de-
velopments that transcend traditional categories. As one
commentator has observed:
Once we start to separate sex from conception and gestation from
genetics, we jeopardize some rather basic assumptions about the en-
tire structure of life. If a child can have many mothers-genetic,
gestational, custodial-how can we use the traditional concept of
"mother" or "family" to judge who should raise the child? 319
319. David DeVoss, Lives in Limbo: Ethical and Legal Implications for Frozen Embryos,
REDBOOK, Feb. 1990, at 102, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnews File (quoting Michael
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That question, as is true of the other, similar questions addressed in
this Article, is not an end-point, but typifies the modern challenge to
law.
The autocatalytic process of technologically driven social change
forces the abandonment of traditional concepts in favor of more rele-
vant, more flexible points of view. The push of technology inevitably
challenges every area of law, and now, after several hundred years of
relative quietude, the law of inheritance must face the winds of major,
technologically-driven, social change.
H. Shapiro, a professor of law who teaches bioethics at the University of Southern California
Law Center in Los Angeles).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX
THE TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES OF
CRYOPRESERVATION OF
REPRODUCTIVE MATERIAL
Since 1990, cryopreservation of embryos has become routine. In
1993 alone approximately "13,000 human embryos were thawed and
implanted into American women. '320 The increasingly frequent use
of these and other reproductive technologies which are the subject of
this Article merits a brief account of the technological processes at
issue.
CRYOPRESERVATION OF HUMAN EMBRYOS
Human embryos can be frozen at the zygote, early cleavage, or blas-
tocyst stages.321 Which stage is best is undecided. 322 Some studies
have shown that the post-thaw survival rate can range from nine to
eighty-eight percent and pregnancy rates can range from zero to fifty-
three depending on which developmental stage the embryo was fro-
zen. 323 "A literature review . . . indicate[s] that currently available
cryopreservation procedures are most successful for one-cell fertilized
oocytes. ' '324 Human embryos can be cryopreserved by slow cooling or
rapid freezing techniques. Studies have shown no decrease in embryo
survival or pregnancy rates with extended length of cryopreserva-
tion.325 However, out of fear that children could be born after de-
cades in storage, in 1991 England passed a law which required the
destruction of frozen embryos after five years of storage despite the
absence of scientific evidence that a longer storage period was
harmful.326
320. Robert Cooke, New Evidence Prompts Concerns About Deep-Freezing Live Embryos,
Hous. CHRON., Jan. 21, 1995 at A5, available in LEXIS, News Library, Hchron File.
321. Neri Laufer et al., In-Vitro Fertilization, in INFERTILITY: A COMPREHENSIVE TExT 481,
497 (Machelle M. Seibel, M.D. ed., 1990) (hereinafter INFERTILITY).
322. Pierre Jouannet et al., Cryopreservation and Infertility, in INFERTILITY, supra note 321, at
525, 531.
323. Alan Trounson, Ph.D. & Jillian Shaw, Ph.D., The Cryopreservation of Human Eggs and
Embryos, in REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE AND SURGERY 860, 861 (Edward E. Wallach, M.D. et al.
eds., 1995) [hereinafter REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE AND SURGERY].
324. Id.
325. Yeong P. Lin, M.D. et al., Successful Implantation of Frozen Sibling Embryos Is Influ-
enced by the Outcome of the Cycle from Which They Were Derived, 63 FERTILITY AND STERILITY
262, 267 (1995).
326. Jenny Hope, Infertile Couples Fear for Their "Ice Babies," DAILY MAIL, June 20, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Mail File.
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Both slow cooling and rapid freezing require a cryoprotectant to be
in the cryopreservation solution. The cryoprotectant enables the cells
to survive cooling to sub-zero temperatures. 327 The embryos selected
for cryopreservation are transferred to the cryopreservation solution
and allowed to equilibrate with the cryoprotectant. 328 This allows
water to pass out of the cells and cryoprotectant to pass in.329 Nor-
mally, equilibration is carried out at room temperature because the
embryos tolerate the cryoprotectant concentrations well at this
temperature. 330
Slow Cooling
Once loaded into the container, the embryos are cooled to approxi-
mately minus seven degrees Celsius, a few degrees below the freezing
point of the cryopreservation solution.331 The embryologist touches
the outside of the container with a precooled object. The ice formed
at the point of contact spreads through the whole solution causing the
salt concentration to rise and the embryo to begin dehydrating.332
Slow cooling (less than one degree Celsius per minute) enables the
equilibrium conditions to be maintained.333 The embryos are cooled
to very low temperatures and stored in liquid nitrogen. 334
Rapid Freezing
The rapid freezing technique utilizes higher concentrations of cry-
oprotectants; however, the cryoprotectant does not exceed forty per-
cent of the total cryopreservation solution.335 The embryos are
transferred into a 0.25-mL clear plastic insemination straw.336 The
straw is sealed and, after three minutes, submerged into liquid
nitrogen.337
327. Trounson & Shaw, supra note 323, at 861.
328. Id. at 862.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 863-64.
336. Id. at 864.
337. Id.
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CRYOPRESERVATION OF HUMAN OOCYTES AND SPERM
Mature preovulatory human oocytes have been successfully cry-
opreserved using the conventional slow cooling techniques. 338 How-
ever, survival rates tend to be low and there is a high risk of
chromosomal abnormalities.339
Human sperm is tolerant to a wide range of cooling rates (one-half
degree to fifty degrees Celsius per minute). 340 After cooling, the
sperm is stored in liquid nitrogen at approximately minus 196 degrees
Celsius. 341 The ultra rapid cooling techniques used with embryos have
not yet been tried with sperm.342 Although there is some loss of mo-
tility due to the cold shock and/or dilution in the cryoprotective me-
dium,3 43 studies have shown sperm motility remains stable when
cryopreserved more than ten years.344 The primary risk of lengthy
storage in liquid nitrogen is accumulated exposure to cosmic radiation
which may not accumulate enough exposure to cause harm for hun-
dreds of years. 345 Despite this, the current trends persists that sperm
survival declines over time so many banks limit storage time to ten
years. 346 Freezing sperm cells often reduces their fertilizing capacity;
however, recent success in freezing spermatological stem cells may
eliminate this problem. 347
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Don P. Wolf, Ph.D., Cryopreservation of Sperm, in REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE AND SUR-
GERY, supra note 323, at 795, 800.
341. Id. at 795.
342. Id. at 800.
343. Jouannet et al., supra note 322, at 528.
344. Id. at 530.
345. Wolf, supra note 340, at 803.
346. Id.
347. See Tim Beardsley, Mouse to Father Rat?, SCI. AM., Aug. 1, 1996, at 26; see also
Lemonick, supra note 1, at 69.
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